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We implemented a randomized field experiment that tested ways to stimulate savings by 
international migrants in their origin country. We find that migrants value and take advantage of 
opportunities to exert greater control over financial activities in their home countries. In 
partnership with a Salvadoran bank, we offered U.S.-based migrants bank accounts in El 
Salvador. We randomly varied migrant control over El Salvador-based savings by offering 
different types of accounts across treatment groups. Migrants offered the greatest degree of 
control accumulated the most savings at the partner bank, compared to others offered less or no 
control over savings. Impacts are likely to represent increases in total savings: there is no 
evidence that savings increases were simply reallocated from other savings mechanisms. 
Enhanced control over home-country savings does not affect remittances sent home by migrants.  
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I. Introduction  
Attempts to understand the extent and nature of conflict between household members are 
central to research on the economics of the family. Many empirical studies have cast serious 
doubt on the “unitary model” of the household, the proposition that the joint actions of a 
household comprised of separate optimizing individuals can be represented as the actions of a 
single utility-maximizing agent.
1 Models that take explicit account of potential preference 
differences among household members include Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney 
(1981), and Lundberg and Pollak (1993). Browning and Chiappori (1998) provide empirical 
evidence rejecting the unitary model, but in favor of household efficiency in resource allocation. 
On the other hand, evidence of productive inefficiencies in intra-household allocation has been 
found in a variety of contexts.
2 
A leading candidate explanation for observed inefficiencies is asymmetry of information 
in the household, which reduces the ability of household members to enforce mutually-beneficial 
cooperative agreements among themselves.
3 This idea has motivated new research that focuses 
on transnational households, or households with members who have migrated to other countries. 
Due to the absence of the migrant member, these are households where information asymmetries 
should be particularly pronounced. If migrants do not share the same financial objectives as 
family members remaining back home, information asymmetries may prevent migrants from 
achieving objectives that require the assistance or participation of relatives remaining in the 
home country.
4  
An improved understanding of financial decision-making within transnational households 
is important because flows of resources within such households are large in magnitude, and 
therefore may have important aggregate impacts. In 2011, migrant remittances sent to developing 
countries amounted to US$353 billion. In comparison, in that year developing country receipts of 
foreign direct investment (the largest type of international financial flow going to the developing 
                                                 
1 See the review in Strauss and Thomas (1995), as well as Duflo (2003), Rangel (2006), and Martinez (2013). 
2 See Udry (1996), Dercon and Krishnan (2000), Goldstein, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2005), and Dubois and Ligon 
(2005), among others. 
3Ashraf (2009) shows that individual saving decisions change when observed by one’s spouse. Recent work on the 
savings and risk-sharing consequences of intra-household preference differences and asymmetric information 
includes Schaner (2011), Kinnan (2011), and Hertzberg (2011). 
4 In analyses of observational data, Chen (2006) and De Laat (2008) find empirical patterns consistent asymmetric 
information in migrant households, as evidenced by migrant monitoring of spouses in home areas (among domestic 
migrants in Kenya and China, respectively). 2 
 
world) were not quite double that figure ($646 billion), while receipts of official development 
assistance (foreign aid) came in a poor third to remittances and FDI, amounting to just $141 
billion.
5 International financial institutions and developing country governments are keenly 
interested in identifying policies that can enhance the development impacts of international 
migration and the accompanying resource flows.
6 
The substantial policy interest in remittances stands in stark contrast to the limited 
empirical evidence that can help guide policy.
7  A number of questions related to decision-
making in transnational households are of general economic interest, and policy-relevant. To 
what extent do migrants seek to monitor and control financial decision-making by household 
members remaining in the home country? What kinds of financial product innovations might 
enhance migrant ability to exert such monitoring and control? If given the opportunity to do so, 
would migrants seek to exert greater control over such decisions, and what would be the 
resulting impacts on financial decision-making in the transnational household?  
To shed light on these questions, we conducted a randomized controlled trial among 
U.S.-based migrants from El Salvador. We randomized offers to migrants of financial products 
that varied the degree to which they could monitor and control savings in bank accounts in their 
home country.
8 In survey data we collected, Salvadoran migrants report that they would like 
recipient households to save 21.2% of remittance receipts, while recipients prefer to save only 
2.6% of receipts. Migrants often intend savings to be for future use by the recipient household, 
but such savings also can be intended for the migrants themselves. In the latter case, migrants 
may send their own funds to be saved in El Salvador because they perceive savings held in the 
U.S. to be relatively insecure (particularly for undocumented migrants who fear deportation and 
loss of their assets).  
Migrants in the study were randomly assigned to a control group or to one of three 
treatment conditions that offered financial products with varying levels of monitoring and control 
over savings in El Salvador. We examine the effect on our outcomes of interest: take-up and 
                                                 
5 Data on remittances, FDI, and ODA are from World Development Indicators 2013. 
6 Recent reports on remittances funded by the Inter-American Development Bank include Pew Hispanic Center 
(2002) and Terry and Wilson (2005). World Bank publications include World Bank (2006) and World Bank (2007). 
7 See Yang (2011) for a review of the state of research on the economics of migrant remittances. 
8 Chin, Wilcox, and Karkoviata (2010) conduct an experiment on savings among Mexican immigrants in Texas, 
finding that immigrants are more likely to open U.S. savings accounts, accumulate more savings in the U.S., and 
remit less to Mexico when they are helped obtain an I.D. that facilitates opening U.S. bank accounts.  3 
 
balances in savings accounts of various types. Our comparison group is referred to as Treatment 
0, and received no offer of any new financial products. In Treatment 1, migrants were offered the 
opportunity to open a new account in the name of someone in El Salvador, into which the 
migrant could remit funds. This account allows the migrant to deposit but not to withdraw, nor to 
observe withdrawals. Treatment 2 offered the migrant the opportunity to open an account to be 
held jointly by the migrant and someone in El Salvador. This new joint account allows joint 
observability of account balances as well as joint withdrawals (both the migrant and the El 
Salvador person are given an ATM card for the account). Finally, in Treatment 3 migrants were 
offered, in addition to the accounts offered in Treatments 1 and 2, the option to open an account 
in the migrant’s name only.
9  Thus, each treatment nests the one prior to it so that the effect of 
offering additional products can be understood.  Project staff delivered a marketing pitch for 
each product, according to its features.
10 Data on financial transactions at our partner bank come 
from the bank’s administrative records. Baseline and follow-up surveys administered to migrants 
in the U.S. provide data on other outcomes. 
  Our results provide evidence that migrants do value and take advantage of opportunities 
to exert control over savings in their home country. Migrants were much more likely to open 
savings accounts at the partner bank in El Salvador, and accumulated more savings at the partner 
bank, if they were assigned to the treatment condition offering the greatest degree of monitoring 
and control (Treatment 3). Migrants desire savings that are jointly held with family members, as 
well as savings only for themselves: we observe substantial increases in savings in both the joint 
accounts shared between migrants and someone in El Salvador (offered in Treatments 2 and 3), 
and in the accounts for migrants alone (offered only in Treatment 3).
11 This increase in savings 
in the new accounts we offered is likely to be a true increase in savings; we find no evidence that 
these funds were simply shifted over from other types of savings (either from other accounts at 
the partner bank, or from other types of savings reported in the follow-up survey). 
Strikingly, the impact of Treatment 1 (where we offered accounts in the name only of 
someone in El Salvador) on savings was much smaller in magnitude and not statistically 
                                                 
9 In Treatments 2 and 3, upon request migrants would also have been allowed to open an account for someone in El 
Salvador only (the account offered in Treatment 1). No migrants made such a request. 
10 Moving from Treatments 0 to 3, marketing pitch content was only added (never subtracted), so the marketing 
pitches were “nested” in the same way that the product offers were. 
11 These impacts are large in economic magnitude. For example, Treatment 3 leads to an increase of $285 in average 
account balances (across all accounts at the partner bank) in the 12 months post-treatment. By comparison, average 
balances at the partner bank were just $183 in the comparison group (Treatment 0) over the same period. 4 
 
significantly different from zero. This result is also important, as it reveals that the frequently-
made policy recommendation to foster savings in migrants’ home countries by encouraging 
migrants to remit directly into savings accounts of remittance recipients would be much less 
effective, compared to interventions that also improved and encouraged migrant monitoring and 
control over home-country savings. 
We also provide additional evidence suggestive that the increases in savings due to 
Treatment 3 are due to improvements in migrant ability to control recipient savings in El 
Salvador. We show that savings increases in joint accounts at the partner bank (shared by 
migrants and someone in El Salvador) are concentrated among migrants who revealed a demand 
for control over remittance uses in the baseline (pre-treatment) survey (for example, among 
migrants who had previously sent funds to El Salvador for others to administer, or who were 
aware of disagreements between migrants and recipients over the use of remittances).  
In addition, although both Treatments 2 and 3 offered joint accounts shared by migrants 
and someone in El Salvador, take-up of these accounts was statistically significantly higher in 
Treatment 3, when migrant-only accounts were also offered. This pattern is suggestive of decoy 
effects (Laran et al 2011, Chatterjee and Rose 2012). Offering migrant-only accounts as part of 
the menu of products may have drawn attention to the control features of accounts offered. The 
joint account, while not allowing the same degree of full control as the migrant-only account, 
provided greater control than most accounts that migrants remit into: it provided the migrant the 
opportunity to check balances and an ATM card with which to withdraw from the account. 
Offering the migrant-only account alongside the joint account in Treatment 3 may have 
encouraged migrants to pay more attention to the control features of the joint account. 
We also provide evidence suggesting that our treatment effects do not derive from the 
marketing pitches alone. Joint account savings at other banks (aside from our partner bank) are 
not affected by the treatments. We interpret this as evidence that our offer of accounts at our 
partner bank were necessary to produce the effects on savings we observe.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides details on the 
study design. Section 3 describes the characteristics of the sample. Section 4 presents the main 
empirical results. Section 5 provides discussion and additional analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
II. Study Design 
Sampling Protocol and Baseline Survey 5 
 
Study participants are immigrants in the greater Washington D.C. area. To be eligible for 
inclusion in the sample, individuals had to have: 1) been born in El Salvador, 2) entered the U.S. 
for the first time within the last 15 years, and 3) sent a remittance to someone in El Salvador 
within the last 12 months. 
Migrants were recruited as follows. We stationed our survey team at the two Salvadoran 
consulates in the Washington DC area (in DC and in Woodbridge, Virginia). The main services 
sought by study participants at the consulate were passport renewals, civil registration (of births, 
deaths, and marriages), and assistance with processing of Temporary Protected Status (a special 
provision allowing temporary legal work for Salvadorans and other nationalities who entered the 
U.S. after natural disasters or civil strife in the home country). The consulate of El Salvador 
serves Salvadorans regardless of their legal status, and so the sample likely includes both 
documented and undocumented migrants (we intentionally did not ask any questions related to 
immigration status.) The El Salvador consulate endorsed our study; intermittently, a consular 
staffer would make an announcement in the waiting area endorsing participation in the study. 
Survey team members were mostly of Salvadoran origin, and mostly female. Survey team 
members approached individuals in the waiting area of the consulate, inviting them to participate 
in the study. The DC baseline survey fieldwork ran from June 2007 to January 2008.  Individuals 
were told the name of the study, the academic institutions involved, and that the survey was 
about “Salvadorans who send remittances and their family who receive them in El Salvador.” 
Individuals were asked the three screening questions (above), and if eligible were invited to 
participate. Those who agreed and signed consent forms were administered the baseline survey at 
the consulate. Of 5,288 people approached at the consulate, 3,611 passed the screening 
questions, and 1,986 agreed to participate and completed the baseline survey. 
After completion of a migrant baseline survey in the DC area, a separate survey team 
attempted to survey the individual in El Salvador whom the migrant identified as his or her 
primary remittance recipient (or “PRR”). The survey team successfully completed 1,338 El 
Salvador household surveys between November 2007 and June 2008. After attempting a survey 
of an El Salvador household (whether successfully completed or not), a project staff member (a 
“marketer”) in DC then attempted to schedule (by phone) and carry out (in person) a marketing 
visit with the corresponding migrant, at which the treatments were administered. Many migrants 
were reluctant to make time for these visits, and we were unable to re-contact some respondents 6 
 
due to invalid or changed phone numbers. Marketers made appointments for 1,054 marketing 
visits. (Due to no-shows at the scheduled visits, our final sample size is slightly lower.)  
Marketers carried out marketing visits at locations chosen by migrants. Random 
assignment to Treatment 0, 1, 2, or 3 occurred only after a marketing visit with the migrant had 
been scheduled, but before the actual visit was carried out. Study participants did not learn their 
treatment assignment prior to the actual face-to-face marketing visit. Visits took from 1-2 hours. 
Marketers were paid a flat fee for each completed visit that was the same for all treatment 
conditions (to avoid any differential incentive to complete visits of different types). The 
marketing visits were carried out between December 2007 and July 2008. The four treatments 
are described below, and details of marketing scripts are in Online Appendix A. 
Our sample for analysis in this paper is 898 migrants with whom a face-to-face marketing 
visit was successfully carried out (along with their associated primary-remittance-recipient 
household in El Salvador). While attrition from the baseline survey to completed marketing visits 
is certainly detrimental to our sample size, it should not affect the internal validity of the study, 
because at no stage prior to the in-person marketing visit did study participants know their 
treatment assignment. 
The resulting migrant sample comprises a reasonable cross-section of Salvadoran 
migrants in the Washington, D.C. area. Online Appendix Table 1 presents means of several key 
baseline variables for observations in our baseline data (column 1), in comparison with 
corresponding means for Salvadoran-born and Hispanic individuals in the US Census 2000 in the 
Washington DC metro area, separately for males and females. While differences are not 
dramatic, there are some key differences between our sample and US Census Salvadorans in the 
DC metro area. Focus for the moment on the comparison with column 2, for all Salvadoran-born 
individuals regardless of US citizenship. Our sample is more male, at 71% vs. 57%. Our sample 
has also arrived somewhat more recently in the US, with 49% and 51% of males and females, 
respectively, having been in the US for 5 years or less at the time of survey, compared to 
corresponding figures of 33% and 29% for US Census Salvadorans. Our sample is slightly more 
educated: 30% and 36% of our sample males and females, respectively, have a high school 
degree or more, compared to 27% and 30% of US Census Salvadoran males and females, 
respectively. Our sample is less likely to have US citizenship, at 0-1%, compared to 10-12% for 
US Census Salvadorans. Finally, our sample is more likely to be married or partnered, at 53% 7 
 
and 73% of males and females respectively, compared to 45% and 57% for male and female US 
Census Salvadorans, respectively. These differences vis-à-vis our baseline sample are quite 
similar when restricting the sample of US Census Salvadorans to those without US citizenship 
(column 3), and when examining Hispanics without US citizenship (column 4). 
Experimental Design 
In conjunction with our partner bank in El Salvador, Banco Agricola, we designed the 
savings facilities offered in this project, “Cuenta Unidos” and “Ahorro Directo” (described 
further below). Neither of these savings products existed previously. Our study only offered the 
new products to study participants randomized into certain treatment conditions. That said, 
anyone asking for these new products (say, if they heard about them from study participants) 
were allowed to open them by partner bank staff. To reduce contamination of our treatment 
effect estimates from spillovers to the comparison group (Treatment 0), our partner bank agreed 
not to market or advertise the new products designed for this study in any fashion until the 
follow-up survey was implemented (roughly a year after treatment).  
Migrants were randomly assigned to one of three treatment groups or a comparison 
group, each with equal (25%) probability. We randomized after stratifying migrants into 48 cells 
representing unique combinations four baseline categorical variables: gender (male, female), US 
bank account ownership (yes, no), primary remittance recipient’s relationship to migrant (parent, 
spouse, child, other), and years in US category (0-5, 6-10, 11-15). Stratified randomization was 
carried out between the completion of the baseline survey and the marketing visit attempt; 
because not all marketing visits were successful, it is not guaranteed that treatment conditions are 
precisely balanced on the stratification variables. 
Treatments were administered in the marketing visits mentioned above. Migrants in the 
comparison group (labeled Treatment 0) were not offered any new products. (Because this study 
investigates control over savings, to avoid confusion we refer to Treatment 0 as the “comparison 
group”, not the “control group.”) The three treatment groups were labeled 1, 2, and 3. The 
presence of the comparison group allows us to observe outcomes for a comparable sample where 
none of the products were offered.   
To help track migrants’ remittance behavior after the visit, all visited migrants were given 
a special card (called a “VIP card”) that provided a discount for sending remittances via 
Banagricola remittance locations in the DC area. Banco Agricola’s normal remittance charge is 8 
 
$10 for a remittance up to $1,500, and the VIP card allowed the migrant to send a remittance for 
a randomly-determined price of either $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, or $9 (once randomly assigned at the 
outset, the price was fixed for the validity period of the card).
12 Eligibility for the card was 
conditional on the migrant presenting an identification document of some sort (usually a 
Salvadoran passport). Migrants were told to bring an identification document in the initial phone 
call making the appointment for the marketing visit. 
Treatment Groups 
Treatment 0 (comparison group): Encouragement to remit into bank account of someone in El 
Salvador 
  Migrants assigned to Treatment 0 were visited by a marketer who encouraged them to 
remit into El Salvador bank accounts. Marketers emphasized the benefits of remitting funds 
directly into accounts and of remittance-recipient access to funds via ATM/debit cards (rather 
than having to wait in a teller line to receive a remittance). Migrants were offered the VIP card, 
but were not offered any new savings facilities. 
  This generic pitch to remit into bank accounts was included in the control condition to 
ensure that any increases in savings seen in Treatments 1, 2, or 3 (vs. corresponding changes in 
Treatment 0) was not due simply to the encouragement provided by the marketers to remit into 
bank accounts in El Salvador.  
Treatment 1: Offer of account for someone in El Salvador 
  In Treatment 1, marketers also emphasized the same benefits of remitting into bank 
accounts (as in Treatment 0), and provided the VIP card. But unlike in Treatment 0, in Treatment 
1 this was combined with an offer of assistance in setting up an account in the name of someone 
in El Salvador, into which the migrant could remit. While the migrant would be able to make 
deposits into this account, the migrant would not be able to observe the balance of and 
withdrawals from this account.  Relative to Treatment 0, the Treatment 1 marketing pitch also 
added a brief comment that “savings for your remittance recipient in El Salvador” was a benefit 
of the Treatment 1 offer (but with no other elaboration on the general benefits of bank accounts). 
To equalize account-opening costs across Treatments 1 and 2, this remittance-recipient-only 
                                                 
12 This remittance price randomization was independent of the randomization into Treatments 0, 1, 2, or 3, and so 
does not confound interpretation of any differences across treatments. In addition, migrants did not learn the actual 
discounted VIP price until after the marketing visit had concluded. The remittance price randomization was 
implemented for a separate study within the same study population on the impact of remittance prices on the 
frequency and amount of remittances (Aycinena, Martinez, and Yang 2010). 9 
 
account offered in Treatment 1 was exactly the same product (Cuenta Unidos) offered in 
Treatment 2. The difference was that in Treatment 1 we did not facilitate making the migrant a 
joint account-holder on the Cuenta Unidos account. 
Migrants could identify anyone in El Salvador as the account holder (not just the 
“primary remittance recipient” or PRR to whom the baseline survey was administered.) If 
migrants were interested, they filled out forms to provide the name, address, and phone number 
of the individual in El Salvador for whom the account was intended. The marketer offered to let 
the migrant use a project cell phone to call the person in El Salvador during the visit to inform 
them of the new account.
13 Within the next few days, project staff arranged by phone for the 
individual in El Salvador to meet with the branch manager of the nearest Banco Agricola branch 
in El Salvador to complete the final account-opening procedures in person. 
Effects of Treatment 1 on take-up and savings accumulation (vis-à-vis Treatment 0) 
would reflect the impact of offering assistance with account-opening procedures. In addition, 
relative to Treatment 0, Treatment 1 potentially improves what one might call the “identity 
precision” of remittances and savings: the migrant’s ability to channel remittances towards a 
particular person’s savings account. Because the account offered in Treatment 1 is in the name of 
someone in El Salvador, any impacts found could not be due to changes in the migrant’s ability 
to monitor or control savings balances. Even if it failed to offer migrants greater monitoring or 
control, migrants might have found the account offered in Treatment 1 attractive if they thought 
that a savings account would be beneficial for the recipient, or if they wanted to use a recipient’s 
savings account as a safe and convenient destination for remittances to that recipient.  
Treatment 2: Offer of joint account for migrant and someone in El Salvador  
  In Treatment 2, we offered migrants the “Cuenta Unidos” account which was newly 
designed for this project. This savings facility allows joint ownership by both an individual in El 
Salvador and the migrant in the US. Joint account owners in both the US and El Salvador had 
ATM cards and full access to account information. Migrants could deposit funds into the account 
via remittances, withdraw with their ATM card via US ATMs, and check the balance on the 
account by calling a toll-free U.S. telephone number. Joint account owners in El Salvador could 
deposit and withdraw using their ATM cards or via bank tellers.  
                                                 
13 To mitigate any possibility that talking to the primary recipient might have an effect on outcomes of interest, 
migrants assigned to Treatment 0 were also offered a complimentary phone call to the primary recipient from the 
project cell phone. 10 
 
  The substantive content conveyed by the marketing pitch in Treatment 1 was also 
conveyed in Treatment 2, but in addition, the Treatment 2 marketing pitch also noted that both 
the migrant and the El Salvador account holder could verify the balance on the Cuenta Unidos 
account, and that the migrant could withdraw funds from the account from the US. 
  If migrants were interested in Cuenta Unidos, they filled out account-opening forms. As 
in Treatment 1, migrants provided contact information for the joint account holder in El 
Salvador, and marketers and other project staff facilitated the account opening process on the El 
Salvador side (by offering the migrant a free call on their project cell phone and arranging the 
account opening appointment in El Salvador). Migrants could identify anyone in El Salvador as 
the joint account holder. Migrants had the option to not have joint ownership of the new account 
(in other words, they could replicate the account offered in Treatment 1).
14 Compared to 
Treatment 1, Treatment 2 offered migrants the ability to monitor the savings of family members, 
but did not provide full control over the funds. The joint account holder in El Salvador had 
complete freedom to withdraw the entire savings balance from the account. 
Treatment 3: Offer of joint account for migrant and someone in El Salvador, plus migrant-only 
account 
  Treatment 3 nests Treatment 2, while adding an additional savings facility: an account 
exclusively in the migrant’s name, known as “Ahorro Directo” (also newly designed for the 
project). This is an account only in the name of the migrant. The migrant could deposit into the 
account by remitting into it, and received an ATM card for withdrawals at US ATMs.
15 
  In this marketing visit, Cuenta Unidos and Ahorro Directo were offered to the migrant in 
sequence. Cuenta Unidos was offered first, using a marketing script identical to the one used for 
Treatment 2. The marketing script for Ahorro Directo, which followed, emphasized its 
usefulness for exclusive control over funds, since the account would not be shared with anyone 
else. The script noted that no one other than the client would be able to check account balances, 
have access to the account, or even know of the existence of the account. The script also noted 
that no intermediaries (e.g., family members) would be needed for the client to save in El 
                                                 
14 However, all accounts we assisted in opening in Treatment 2 were joint accounts. Not once did a migrant request 
to forego joint ownership of Cuenta Unidos in Treatment 2. 
15 A question that arises is why migrants would not have opened their own bank accounts in El Salvador prior to 
being offered them by our project. Our results will indeed show that the marketing and account-opening assistance 
offered by our project led to opening of these accounts. While our study is not designed to shed light on these 
barriers directly, it is likely that the reduction in transaction costs of account opening due to our account-opening 
assistance was non-trivial.  11 
 
Salvador. In addition, the script noted the benefit of improved security if visiting El Salvador by 
reducing the need to carry large amounts of cash.
16 
  For the purpose of the study, it is important to be able to rule out that any differences 
across Treatments 2 and 3 are due to differences in transaction costs. Therefore, in Treatment 3, 
if migrants wanted to open an Ahorro Directo account, we required them to also open a Cuenta 
Unidos account, ensuring that account opening transaction costs were identical across 
Treatments 2 and 3.
17 In addition, migrants were allowed to open an account only in the name of 
a beneficiary in El Salvador (as in Treatment 1) if they requested it.
18 
  In sum, Treatment 3 offered the migrant the greatest ability to control funds in savings 
accounts in El Salvador, unlike Treatment 2 where ownership had to be joint with someone else. 
The difference in takeup and savings between Treatments 2 and 3 therefore reveals the 
incremental impact of offering migrants the ability to exclusively control their El Salvador 
savings balances. 
Other important notes on the treatment conditions 
  It is important to be clear that the pitch for each product did not vary across treatment 
conditions. However, because treatments differed in the products offered, treatments did involve 
different pitches that were delivered alongside their associated products. In particular, the joint 
account, Cuenta Unidos, was offered in both Treatments 2 and 3, but the pitch that accompanied 
that product offer was identical across those two treatments. In Treatment 3, Ahorro Directo was 
also offered, with its own additional pitch. Online Appendix A provides details on these product-
specific pitches. 
                                                 
16 Notwithstanding the way Ahorro Directo was marketed, one might imagine that migrants could still have used 
these accounts for joint savings with El Salvador persons, for example if migrants sent their Ahorro Directo ATM 
cards to individuals in El Salvador to provide them account access. There is no evidence that this occurred, however. 
Analysis of withdrawal data from these accounts shows that transactions on these accounts (both deposits and 
withdrawals) occurred exclusively on the US side over the period analyzed in this paper. Not a single deposit into or 
withdrawal from an Ahorro Directo account occurred in El Salvador through the end of 2009. 
17 By requiring that migrants wanting an Ahorro Directo also open a Cuenta Unidos, the migrant had to get an 
individual in El Salvador to physically visit a Banco Agricola branch there to fill out account-opening documents. If 
we had not instituted this requirement, then the transaction cost for opening an Ahorro Directo would have been 
much lower than for opening a Cuenta Unidos, because the former would not have required a trip by someone in El 
Salvador to a Banco Agricola branch. The upshot of this design is that take-up of Ahorro Directo in Treatment 3 will 
be a lower bound of what take-up would have been had we not instituted this requirement. We judged that 
improving clarity of interpretation was worth the sacrifice of potentially lower take-up in Treatment 3. Note that in 
Treatment 1, the individual in whose name the account was opened also had to go to a branch in El Salvador, so 
transaction costs are also equalized with Treatment 1. 
18 Again, as in Treatment 2, no migrant assigned to Treatment 3 who chose to open a Cuenta Unidos account opted 
to forego joint ownership. 12 
 
Outcome variables  
The primary outcome variables we examine are savings balances of various types at the 
partner bank, which we obtained from the partner bank’s administrative databases. We focus on 
savings balances over the 12 post-treatment months (after the study participant’s marketing 
visit), but we also provide estimates of treatment effects up to 48 months post-treatment. To 
obtain these data, both the migrant and his or her primary remittance recipient (PRR) were 
located in the partner bank’s administrative data via a search on the basis of matching variables 
(given name, surname, address, phone number, and age) that were obtained from study 
participants before treatment assignment. The search was performed by bank staff on the basis 
our instructions. We provided bank staff with the matching variables, to ensure that no additional 
identifying data (such as improved addresses and phone numbers) that might have been obtained 
from individuals taking up products in the treatment groups would be used in the matching 
process. Had we not done so, our treatment effects on bank balances would be biased upwards 
because more individuals might have been successfully found in the treatment groups that 
involved take-up of bank products.
19  
It should be noted that this matching procedure locates only accounts owned by either the 
migrant or PRR (or both). In other words, it locates joint accounts shared by migrants and PRRs, 
joint accounts shared by migrants and individuals other than the PRR, accounts held only by the 
PRR (without migrant co-ownership), and accounts held only by the migrant (without PRR co-
ownership). However, the procedure fails to locate accounts that migrants might have opened in 
the name of non-PRRs alone (without migrant co-ownership), because we do not have a pre-
treatment list of potential non-PRR account holders to search for in the database. To the extent 
that migrants did open accounts in the name of non-PRRs alone, our results here will understate 
the impacts of the interventions on account-opening and savings. 
In addition, we fielded migrant follow-up surveys roughly one year after the initial 
product offer (from March to June 2009) to measure impacts on savings outside of the partner 
bank. Follow-up surveys of DC-based migrants were conducted via phone by a survey team 
calling from El Salvador.  
Estimation strategy 
                                                 
19 We have confirmed that the data quality of the matching variables are not differential by treatment status. Further 
confirmation that the quality of the matching did not vary by treatment status is that prior to treatment, savings 
balances at the partner bank are balanced across treatment conditions (see Appendix Table 2). 13 
 
Dependent variables of interest in this paper are take-up rates of and balances in savings 
accounts at the partner bank. Let Yi be the dependent variable of interest (say, total savings at the 
partner bank). Let Z1i be an indicator variable for assignment to Treatment 1, Z2i be an indicator 
variable for assignment to Treatment 2, and Z3i be an indicator variable for assignment to 
Treatment 3. We estimate treatment effects using the following regression equation:  
Yi =  + α1Z1i + α2Z2i + α3Z3i + Xi’ + μi           (1) 
 Coefficients  α1, α2, and α3 are the impact on the dependent variable of Treatments 1, 2, 
and 3, respectively. We focus on intent to treat (ITT) effects, and so are estimating the effect of 
offering (rather than opening) the various accounts.  
The difference (α3- α2) represents the difference in the impact of Treatment 3 vis-à-vis 
Treatment 2, and the difference (α2- α1) represents the difference in the impact of Treatment 2 
vis-à-vis Treatment 1. Xi is a vector of control variables which include fixed effects (for 
marketer, stratification cell, and month of marketing visit when treatments were administered) 
and an indicator variable for the individual expressing demand for control over financial 
decision-making of primary remittance recipients in the baseline survey (described further 
below). μi  is a mean-zero error term. For all coefficient estimates, we report robust 
(Huber/White) standard errors that account for survey design.
20 
One of our key dependent variables is savings balances, which potentially have large 
outliers that could have disproportionate influence on the estimates. Therefore, in all results 
tables for impacts on savings balances, we focus on impacts on the quartic root of savings 
balances, a specification which reduces the influence of outliers (these will be presented in Panel 
A of the relevant tables). We also report impacts on the dollar amount of savings balances (in 
Panel B), but will consider this specification secondary to the quartic root specification. 
III. Sample Characteristics  
Our primary sample for analysis, which we use to analyze impacts on savings at the 
partner bank, consists of the 898 DC-area migrants who completed a baseline survey as well as a 
marketing visit some months later.  
Characteristics of migrants and remittance-receiving households 
                                                 
20 Specifically, regressions are run with Stata’s “svy” option, where data are “svyset” to account for survey strata 
(the stratification cells). 14 
 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. Several measures of demand for control are 
available in the baseline survey administered to migrants. We construct five separate indicator 
variables equal to one (and zero otherwise) from migrant reports of the following: a) the migrant 
had ever paid directly for expenditures of remittance recipients in El Salvador, rather than 
sending cash (7.7% of migrants did so); b) the migrant had sent funds home for others to 
administer on his/her behalf (23.7% of migrants did so); c) the migrant was interested in direct 
payments to improve control over remittance uses (20.7% of migrants said yes); d) the migrant 
knew anyone who had had conflict with recipients over remittance uses (14.6% of migrants said 
yes); e) the migrant has had conflict with his/her own remittance recipients over remittance uses 
(4.9% of migrants said yes). We construct an overall indicator of “demand for control” that takes 
on the value of 1 if the migrant answers affirmatively to any of the five abovementioned 
indicator variables, and 0 otherwise. 51% of migrants answered “yes” to at least one of these 
questions.  
The baseline survey also included three questions assessing financial literacy that have 
been included in surveys of financial literacy worldwide (Lusardi and Mitchell 2006).
21 66%, 
64%, and 37% of migrants responded correctly to the questions on (respectively) compound 
interest, inflation, and mutual funds. We also asked whether migrants tracked spending and 
budgeted expenses. 46% of migrants reported “always” or “almost always” doing so. 
Balance and attrition across treatment groups 
It is important to check whether randomization across treatments achieved the goal of 
balance in terms of pre-treatment characteristics of study participants. Online Appendix Table 2 
presents the means of a number of baseline variables for each treatment group as reported prior 
to treatment. The first column of reported p-values is for F-tests of equality of means across the 
treatment groups, for each variable separately. The other three columns of p-values are for F-
tests of the pairwise equality of means between observations in Treatment 0 and (respectively) 
Treatments 1, 2, and 3. The table also examines account ownership and average savings balances 
                                                 
21 The questions are: 1) “Suppose that you have $100 in a savings account with a 2% annual interest rate. If you do 
not touch the money in this account, how much do you think you will have in five years?” (Options are “less than 
$102”, “exactly $102”, and “more than $102”; correct answer is “more than $102”.); 2) “Imagine that the interest 
rate in the savings account where you have $100 is 1%, and that inflation is 2% per year.  A year from now, would 
you be able to buy more, the same, or less than today with the money in the account?” (correct answer is “buy 
less”); and 3) “Do you think that the following statement is true or false? To buy stocks in only one company is 
more secure than to invest in a mutual fund” (correct answer is “false”). 15 
 
of study participants at the partner bank, during 12 months prior to the month of the marketing 
visit (specified as the quartic root and in dollars, in parallel to the regression results to come).  
The first 9 variables listed in the table are the stratification variables (gender, US bank 
account, relationship to remittance recipient, and years in US category). The p-values on the F-
test of the joint equality of means across all treatments are all far from conventional significance 
levels. In only one out of 27 pairwise comparisons with the Treatment 0 mean is there a 
statistically significant difference in means (the comparison between Treatments 2 and 0 for 
“recipient is migrant’s other relative”).
22 This one rejection of equality is not worrisome, 
however, as the regression estimates to come will control for stratification cell fixed effects 
(estimates will take advantage only of variation in treatment within stratification cell), and all 
results are robust to inclusion or exclusion of the stratification cell fixed effects.  
The remaining variables in the table are other variables for which observations were not 
stratified prior to treatment assignment. For all these remaining variables, the p-values in 
essentially all cases are also large and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the means are 
identical across treatment groups.
23  
Follow-up attrition rates across treatments are presented in the bottom row of Online 
Appendix Table 2.
24 The follow-up survey contains 508 observations with valid migrant-reported 
savings data, for an overall attrition rate of 43.4%. Attrition rates between Treatment 1 and 
Treatment 0 are not statistically significantly different from one another (45% and 49% 
respectively). However, observations in Treatment 2 have statistically significantly lower 
attrition rates than Treatment 0 (amounting to 10 percentage points lower attrition). In addition, 
Treatment 3 has about 7 percentage points lower attrition than does Treatment 0 (and this 
difference is marginally statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.13).  
This pattern of treatment-related attrition raises concerns about selection bias in estimates 
of treatment effects on outcomes measured in the follow-up survey. In Online Appendix Table 3, 
                                                 
22 As mentioned earlier, stratification was carried out prior to the marketing visit, and so failure to complete the 
marketing visit could have led to imbalance on the stratification variables. In addition, some of the stratification cells 
had small numbers of migrants. When the number of migrants in a cell was not a multiple of 4, it was not possible to 
assign exactly 25% of migrants within cell to each treatment. 
23 The three exceptions are the pairwise comparison between Treatments 2 and 0 for “migrant’s annual remittances 
sent”, “migrant is US citizen”, and “migrant is married or partnered”, in which cases the means are significantly 
different at the 10% level. This small number of significant differences can be expected to arise by chance even with 
randomization. 
24 Attrition can be due to non-completion of the follow-up survey as well as missing savings data in that survey. 16 
 
we investigate balance of baseline characteristics across treatment conditions in the follow-up 
sample (N=508), analogous to those examined in Online Appendix Table 2. While across most 
variables there does not seem to be dramatic evidence of differences across treatment conditions 
in the follow-up sample, there does seem to be worrying imbalance in pre-treatment savings at 
the partner bank. An F-test rejects equality of the quartic root of savings at the partner bank prior 
to treatment across all treatment groups at the 10% level, and the difference in this variable 
between Treatments 3 and 0 is statistically significant at the 5% level.
25  
Due to these patterns of differential survey attrition and imbalance in the follow-up 
survey sample, care must be taken in interpretation of any treatment effects estimated using this 
sample. Our focus, therefore, will be on the outcomes observed in the administrative data from 
the partner bank, which are not subject to such concerns.
26  
IV. Impact of Treatments on Savings  
  In this section we examine the impact of the treatments. We first discuss impacts on 
account opening and on savings in accounts at the partner bank. We then discuss whether 
treatment effects are likely to reflect shifting of funds across savings mechanisms, and in that 
context examine treatment effects on savings reported in the follow-up survey.  
Impact on account opening at partner bank 
  We first estimate equation (1) examining the impact of the various treatment conditions 
on take-up of savings accounts at the partner bank. We regress an indicator for the existence of a 
certain type of account in the first through 12
th month post-treatment on indicators for being 
assigned to each of treatment conditions 1 through 3.
27 We examine three categories of accounts 
separately, distinguishing between the two types of new accounts designed for this research 
project (“project accounts”) and other accounts at the partner bank:  
1) Cuenta Unidos accounts. Recall that in Treatments 2 and 3, we offered Cuenta Unidos 
accounts as joint accounts between migrants and someone in El Salvador. In Treatment 1, 
                                                 
25 It is also the case that, among observations assigned to Treatments 2 and 3, attrition from the follow-up survey is 
statistically significantly lower for those with higher post-treatment savings at the partner bank (as observed in the 
partner bank’s internal data).  
26 We also implemented follow-up surveys of households of the primary remittance recipient in El Salvador. This 
survey suffered from even higher attrition, and similar problems with baseline imbalance in partner bank savings. 
We do not present here treatment impacts on outcomes measured in these El Salvador household surveys. That said, 
impacts on savings in this sample are consistent with those found in the migrant follow-up sample. 
27 The indicator is equal to 1 if such an account exists at any time during months 1-12 post-treatment (including 
accounts that may have been open for only part of this period), and 0 otherwise. 17 
 
the accounts we offered were also Cuenta Unidos accounts, but in that case we did not 
offer migrants the opportunity to be joint account holders – the accounts were offered as 
accounts for individuals in El Salvador alone.
28  
2) Ahorro Directo accounts. These accounts were in the name of migrants only. 
3) Other accounts in the name of the migrant or the PRR, excluding those (Cuenta 
Unidos and Ahorro Directo) offered by our project.
29  
Coefficient estimates for regression equation (1) where the dependent variable is 
existence of a Cuenta Unidos account are regressions labeled (a) in Table 2 (without and with, 
control variables, respectively). The coefficient on the constant term in the first column of (a) 
indicates that for 5.9% of migrant-PRR pairs assigned to the comparison group (Treatment 0), a 
Cuenta Unidos account existed during the 12 months post-treatment. (Individuals in Treatment 0 
could have obtained one of these accounts if they learned about their existence independently of 
our marketing team, and could have obtained the account opening documents by calling the 
partner bank’s toll-free number in the US.)  
The coefficients in the first column of (a) on Treatments 1, 2, and 3 are all positive in 
sign, and are each statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The coefficients 
indicate that Treatments 1, 2, and 3 led, respectively, to 15.0, 14.1, and 22.1 percentage points 
higher likelihood of owning a Cuenta Unidos account. These coefficients are very similar when 
control variables included in the regression. 
  Regressions (b) of the table are similar, except that the dependent variable is an indicator 
for the existence of an Ahorro Directo (migrant-only) account. The constant term in the first 
column of (b) indicates that 4.1% of migrants in the comparison group opened such accounts 
(independently of the assistance of our project). The proportion is similar among migrants in 
Treatments 1 and 2: the coefficients on the indicators for those treatments are small and not 
                                                 
28 Due to restrictions on how the partner bank was willing to share data with us, we cannot actually differentiate in 
the partner bank administrative data between Cuenta Unidos accounts held by both migrants and someone in El 
Salvador, and Cuenta Unidos accounts held by only someone in El Salvador (without migrant co-ownership). 
However, we know from our project marketing records that in Treatments 2 and 3, not a single migrant who opened 
an account for someone in El Salvador in Treatments 2 or 3 opted to forego joint ownership of the account. In 
Treatment 1, all accounts opened with the assistance of our project staff were in the name of a person in El Salvador 
alone (consistent with instructions for that treatment). In all treatments, migrants could have found other ways of 
opening Cuenta Unidos accounts without our assistance, and if they did so the accounts would be either joint 
accounts with the migrant or accounts in the name of an El Salvador person alone.  
29 These “other” accounts would have already existed prior to treatment or, if new, would have been opened without 
the assistance of our project staff. 18 
 
statistically different from zero. The coefficient on Treatment 3, on the other hand, is large and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that migrants in that treatment condition were 
23 to 24 percentage points more likely to open an Ahorro Directo account than those in the 
comparison group.  
  Finally, regressions (c) replace the dependent variable with an indicator for the migrant 
owning some other account at the partner bank. The coefficient on the constant in the first 
column of (c) indicates that in 26.5 percent of migrant-PRR pairs, either migrant or PRR has 
some other account at the partner bank. It appears that none of the treatments led to increased 
ownership of these other accounts: there is no large or statistically significant effect of any of the 
treatments on this outcome variable in either regression for this dependent variable.  
The bottom rows of the table present p-values of F-tests of the difference between pairs 
of treatment coefficients. For opening of Cuenta Unidos accounts, the impact of Treatment 3 is 
statistically significantly different from the impact of Treatment 2 at the 5% level, and is 
statistically significantly different from the impact of Treatment 1 at the 10% level. This pattern 
is also exhibited (at 1% significance levels) in regressions (b) (for opening of Ahorro Directo 
accounts). The impact of Treatment 2 is not statistically significantly different from the impact of 
Treatment 1 at conventional significance levels in any of the regressions in the table. 
Impact on savings at the partner bank 
We estimate equation (1) to examine the impact of the treatments on savings balances at 
the partner bank. In Table 3, the dependent variables are average savings balances over the 12 
months after treatment for the various categories of accounts. Regressions where dependent 
variables are expressed as the quartic root of savings are presented in Panel A of each table, with 
corresponding results for savings in dollars in Panel B. 
  In the first two columns of Table 3, the dependent variable is savings in Cuenta Unidos 
accounts.
30 The first column reports coefficient estimates for regressions without control 
variables, while the second column provides corresponding estimates but where control variables 
are included in the regression (this format is repeated for other dependent variables in subsequent 
                                                 
30 As mentioned above, due to the ambiguity in the partner bank’s database, we cannot distinguish between Cuenta 
Unidos savings in joint accounts from Cuenta Unidos savings in accounts in the name of someone in El Salvador 
alone. However, due to the assistance we provided in account opening in Treatments 1, 2, and 3, it is most likely that 
in Treatments 2 and 3 accounts opened via this project are joint accounts, while in Treatment 1 they are most likely 
not joint accounts. In Treatment 0, the few observed Cuenta Unidos accounts were opened without our staff’s 
assistance so we do not know whether these are joint accounts or not. 19 
 
columns). All treatments have positive impacts on Cuenta Unidos savings balances. Estimates in 
Panel A indicate that each treatment has a positive effect on the quartic root of savings, all at 
conventional levels of statistical significance. In Panel B, coefficient estimates of the impact on 
the dollar value of savings are also positive, but are mostly not statistically significantly different 
from zero at conventional levels. 
  Results in the 3
rd and 4
th columns of the table reveal positive impacts of Treatment 3 on 
savings in Ahorro Directo accounts. These effects are statistically significant at the 1% level for 
the quartic root of savings, and at the 10% level for savings in dollars.
31  
  In the 5
th and 6
th columns, where the dependent variables refer to savings in other partner 
bank accounts, point estimates of the effects of Treatment 3 are large in magnitude, but with one 
exception (in the first regression in Panel B) they are not statistically significantly different from 
zero. Estimated effects of Treatments 2 and 1 are mostly small in magnitude, inconsistent in sign 
across specifications, and not statistically significantly different from zero. 
  In the last two columns of the table, dependent variables refer to total savings at the 
partner bank. Impacts of Treatment 3 are all large, positive, and statistically significantly 
different from zero (at the 1% level in Panel A, and the 5% level in Panel B). Point estimates of 
the effects of Treatments 2 and 1 are all also positive, but are all smaller in magnitude and are 
not statistically significantly different from zero. In Panel A, we can reject that the effect of 
Treatment 3 is equal to the effect of either Treatments 2 or 1 at conventional significance levels 
(5% or better).  In Panel B, the effect of Treatment 3 cannot be distinguished from that of 
Treatment 2 at conventional levels, but is statistically significantly larger than the effect of 
Treatment 1 at the 10% level.  
  The result in the last column (with control variables), Panel B, indicates that Treatment 3 
led total savings at the partner bank to be larger by $282. This is a large increase over mean 
partner bank savings in the comparison group ($186).  
  To provide a sense of the percentiles of the savings distribution that are contributing to 
these treatment effects, Figure 1 presents the cumulative distribution function of the quartic root 
of total savings in all project accounts (the dependent variable of the last two columns of Table 3, 
                                                 
31 Interestingly, coefficients are actually negative for Treatments 2 and 1 in these regressions. This may reflect the 
fact that marketing Treatments 2 and 1 focused on encouraging savings in accounts of remittance recipients, and did 
not encourage migrant-only accounts. However, we do not highlight these results, since these impacts are mostly not 
statistically significantly different from zero (and the statistically significant Treatment 2 coefficient in column 3 is 
not robust to inclusion of control variables). 20 
 
Panel A). The CDF is truncated on the vertical axis at the 50
th percentile to enhance visibility.
32 
The CDF for Treatment 3 is clearly shifted to the right compared to the CDFs of the other 
treatments. While treatment effects show up relatively high in the savings distribution, it is far 
from the case that the estimated impacts of Treatment 3 are driven solely by the very topmost 
percentiles of the savings distribution. 
Exploring shifting across savings mechanisms 
A question that naturally arises at this point is whether the treatments led to increases in 
savings overall, or whether increases in savings seen at the partner bank were simply shifted 
from other savings mechanisms (e.g., cash, or other banks). That said, even if all increases we 
find in partner bank savings were simply reallocations of existing savings held elsewhere, our 
results so far would still be revealing of migrant demand for control over home-country savings. 
Reallocation of savings across savings mechanisms is in itself a consequential financial behavior 
that individuals are not likely to take lightly. 
The most natural type of savings reallocation to examine, which we turn to first, is 
shifting of funds from other partner bank accounts to the project accounts. This is an important 
type of shifting to examine, since if study participants do shift, it should be easiest to do so from 
type of one account to another within the partner bank. The results in Table 3 allow us to easily 
check for evidence of shifting of funds within the partner bank. A pattern that would be 
consistent with shifting would be negative coefficients on treatment coefficients in columns (c) 
where the dependent variable is savings in other (non-project) accounts. In addition, if such 
shifting was large enough, we could find no statistically significant impact on total savings at the 
partner bank (columns d).  
It turns out that neither pattern emerges. Coefficients in both column (c) regressions are 
mostly positive (across Panels A and B), and when negative are small in magnitude and not 
statistically significantly different from zero. Indeed, the coefficients on Treatment 3 in column 
(c), in both Panels, are positive, large in magnitude, and hover around the threshold of statistical 
significance, indicating if anything a positive spillover towards “other” saving (rather than 
shifting). In addition, column (d) indicates that, overall, total savings at the partner bank did 
increase in response to Treatment 3, an effect that is statistically significant at conventional 
                                                 
32 Recall from Table 2 that at most (in Treatment 3), only 55% of observations had any account at the partner bank, 
so it is expected that there are many zeros in the data. The percentage of observations with zero savings at the 
partner bank in Treatments 3, 2, 1, and 0 is, respectively, 55%, 66%, 64%, and 68%. 21 
 
levels in both Panels. The results in Table 3, in sum, provide no evidence that treatment effects 
are driven by shifting of funds within the partner bank. 
Of course, shifting could also occur from funds held outside the partner bank. It is 
therefore also useful to examine impacts of the treatments on the stock of savings more broadly, 
as reported by respondents in the follow-up survey (administered roughly one year after the 
intervention). Negative impacts on certain types of savings would be revealing of shifting, while 
there is of course the possibility of positive spillovers on other types of savings, perhaps due to 
the marketing pitch delivered with the new account offers.
33 
Table 4 presents regression estimates of the impact of each treatment on savings reported 
by migrants (the dependent variables are expressed as the quartic root of savings in Panel A and 
in dollars in Panel B). The four columns present impacts on savings reported by the DC-based 
migrant, (a) in banks in El Salvador, (b) in banks in the U.S., (c) in cash, and (d) in total across 
the previous three categories. In both panels, effects of Treatment 3 are positive and large in 
magnitude for savings in El Salvador banks, in US banks, and in total, but most of these 
coefficients are not statistically significantly different from zero at conventional levels. The 
exception is the impact of Treatment 3 on the quartic root of savings in the U.S. (Panel A, 
column b) which is statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level. It also appears 
that the treatment shifted savings away from cash: the Treatment 3 coefficient in column (c) is 
negative and significant at the 5% level in both Panels A and B. 
It appears that Treatment 3 had a positive and statistically significant impact on migrant 
savings in the US. We note that the point estimates of impacts of Treatment 3 on the dollar value 
of El Salvador bank savings and on total savings (Panel B of Table 4) are positive and larger in 
magnitude than the impacts on total savings at the partner bank (see Online Appendix Table 4). 
If the impacts on total savings at the partner bank were simply due to shifting of funds from other 
savings vehicles, then treatment effects in Table 4 should have been smaller in magnitude than 
those in Online Appendix Table 4.  There is therefore no indication that the impacts on total 
savings at the partner bank are simply due to shifting from other savings vehicles. 
                                                 
33 The qualitative results of Table 3 (that were from regressions with the full 898-observation sample) carry through 
in the smaller (N=508) follow-up survey sample. Impacts of the treatments on partner bank savings in this 
subsample are presented in Online Appendix Table 4. The pattern of impacts on partner bank savings in the 12 
months post-treatment (as well as statistical significance levels) in the smaller follow-up samples correspond to 
those in the full sample, and in many cases point estimates are even larger in magnitude. 22 
 
However, recall that (as discussed in Section 3 above) this follow-up sample suffers from 
differential attrition related to treatment, as well as imbalance in baseline pre-treatment savings 
at the partner bank across treatment conditions. These estimates from the follow-up survey data 
should therefore be interpreted with caution, as they may reflect selection bias.
34 
V. Discussion and Additional Analyses 
We now present additional analyses and discussion to help interpret our results, explore 
impacts beyond the first 12 months, and examine impacts on remittances.  
Heterogeneity in treatment effects by baseline demand for control  
A central motivation of this study is the hypothesis that the accounts offered to migrants 
(particularly those in Treatments 2 and 3) would lead to increased savings because they allowed 
migrants to exert greater control over savings in the home country. To test this interpretation of 
our results, we examine the extent to which our treatment effects are heterogeneous vis-à-vis the 
extent to which migrants, in the baseline survey, expressed demand for control over financial 
decision-making in El Salvador primary remittance recipient households.  
Estimates of treatment effect heterogeneity are presented in Table 5. The regressions are 
analogous to those of Table 3 where the dependent variables are different types of savings at the 
partner bank, but now the treatment indicators are each interacted with an indicator for the 
migrant expressing demand for control at baseline (defined above in Section 3; 51% of migrants 
have “demand for control”), and an indicator for “no demand for control” (simply one minus the 
demand for control indicator). The regressions include all control variables (including the main 
effect of the “demand for control” indicator).
 35  
The coefficient on each interaction term is the effect of the given treatment on savings for 
migrants with or without baseline demand for control. F-tests (with p-values reported at the 
bottom of each panel) test the null that the treatment effect is the same across migrants with vs. 
without demand for control. 
In column (a) of Panel A the dependent variable is the quartic root of savings in Cuenta 
Unidos accounts. The coefficient on Treatment 3 * (Demand for control) is positive and 
significant at the 1% level, while that on Treatment 3 * (No demand for control) is much smaller 
                                                 
34 That said, including controls in the regression for baseline savings at the partner bank (the quartic root and in 
dollars) has essentially no effect on the treatment coefficient point estimates or standard errors in Table 4. 
35 Main effects for each treatment do not need to be included because they are fully interacted with “demand for 
control” and “no demand for control”. 23 
 
in magnitude and is not significant at conventional levels. This pattern also holds for the 
Treatment 2 interaction terms. In both these cases, an F-test rejects (at the 5% level) equality of 
the treatment effects across migrants with and without demand for control. In column (a) of 
Panel B, where the dependent variable is expressed in dollars, the qualitative pattern of results is 
the same, but significance levels are lower and F-tests cannot reject equality of coefficients 
across migrants with and without demand for control. This pattern of treatment effect 
heterogeneity for Treatments 3 and 2 is consistent with migrants exerting control over 
remittance-recipient savings in accounts jointly held by migrants and remittance recipients.  
Interestingly, unlike in column (a), in column (b) (where the dependent variable is 
savings in migrant-only Ahorro Directo accounts) it is not the case that Treatment 3 has greater 
impact on savings among migrants with demand for control. In fact, the pattern is reversed: in 
both panels, only Treatment 3 * (No demand for control) is statistically significant at 
conventional levels, it is substantially larger in magnitude than the coefficient on Treatment 3 * 
(Demand for control). F-tests reject (at the 5% level) the equality of the coefficients.  
The contrasting results in columns (a) and (b) suggest that migrant desire to control 
savings decision-making is associated with the objectives behind savings in the home country, 
and therefore choice of savings product. Migrants with demand for control may desire savings to 
be used to primarily for objectives of the remittance recipient, and seek to exert control to help 
ensure the objectives are met. For example, migrants may seek control over savings to help El 
Salvador households build up buffer stocks (precautionary savings) that can be accessed quickly 
by the household in emergencies. This may be the reason behind the differentially large effect of 
Treatment 3 on joint account savings (columns a and b) for migrants with demand for control. 
Migrants without demand for control, on the other hand, may be saving primarily to 
achieve their own objectives (objectives not shared with the remittance recipient). For these 
migrants, access to bank accounts by El Salvador individuals is immaterial, so they are not 
attracted to joint accounts. For example, such migrants may simply want to keep some savings in 
El Salvador for themselves, to provide easy access during visits home or as a safe place to keep 
funds in case the migrant is deported and faces difficulty accessing US bank accounts. These 
migrants therefore save only in the migrant-only accounts. This may explain the differentially 
large effect of Treatment 3 for migrants without demand for control in column (b). 24 
 
In columns (c) and (d), analogous results are presented for savings in other types of 
accounts (not offered by the project) and for total savings at the partner bank. In Panel A’s 
results for the quartic root of these savings variables, while the coefficient on the Treatment 3 
interaction term is larger for migrants with than without demand for control, we cannot reject at 
conventional levels that these coefficients are equal to one another. In Panel B, on the other hand 
(savings in dollars), the Treatment 3* (Demand for control) coefficient is larger than that on 
Treatment 3 * (No demand for control) at the 10% level in both columns.  
Decoy effects 
One pattern in the results is that the impacts related to the joint account (Cuenta Unidos) 
is higher in Treatment 3 than in Treatment 2. This pattern is most prominent in analysis of 
impacts on account opening in Table 2, regressions (a): the coefficient on Treatment 3 is larger 
than that on Treatment 2 (by about 8 percentage points), and the difference between the two is 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level. The same qualitative pattern also 
arises for treatment effects on savings in joint accounts (first two columns of Table 3, Panel A): 
the coefficient on Treatment 3 is larger than the coefficient on Treatment 2, although differences 
are not statistically significant in this case. 
This pattern is a bit of a puzzle for standard models of economic decision-making, since 
the Cuenta Unidos joint account was offered in both Treatment 3 and Treatment 2. One 
explanation for this result is that the offer of the migrant-only Ahorro Directo account in 
Treatment 3 had a “decoy effect” on demand for the joint account.
36 Other research has 
documented decoy effects, or shifts in preference for a certain option when presented with 
another option that might be thought to be irrelevant. For example, Laran, Dalton and Andrade 
(2011) find that priming brands such as Walmart increases consumers’ cost consciousness and 
subsequently reduces their spending intentions—even on alternative products. Chatterjee and 
Rose (2012) found that people primed with cash would then focus on the costs of products while 
those primed with credit cards would focus on the benefits. Then they introduced “decoy 
products”:  in the cash option they introduced a decoy for the benefits choice, while in the credit 
card option they introduced a decoy for the costs choice.  This countered the initial priming, 
reducing the salience of the benefits choice for the credit card prime and of the cost choice for 
                                                 
36 Recall that the “pitch” for the joint account was the same in both Treatments 2 and 3. The difference between the 
treatments was that Treatment 3 also offered the Ahorro Directo migrant-only account, with its own separate pitch. 25 
 
the cash prime.  In other words, the existence of an additional product with certain features 
functions exactly as priming through other sources does: it focuses the attention of the individual 
on those features in evaluating all the products.  
In our study, migrants who were offered both the joint account and the migrant-only 
account (Treatment 3) were more likely to open the joint account than those who were offered 
only the joint account (Treatment 2). That is, the presence of a third option changed the 
migrants’ valuation of the joint account. We believe this likely represents a decoy effect in the 
sense of the literature referenced above. A related concept in economics is a menu effect; both 
are violations of the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom. 
In our case, we think the effect of the option of a private savings account focused the 
migrants on the control features of the joint account, increasing their valuation of the joint 
account. Marketing of the migrant-only savings product emphasized the importance of control 
over savings.  It is likely that this caused migrants to consider the control aspects of the joint 
account more so than when the joint account was offered in isolation. As in Laran et al (2011), 
where the addition of Walmart to a choice set primed subjects to weight cost more, offering the 
migrant-only account likely focused migrants on the control features of the joint account.  
Ruling out that effects are due to marketing pitch alone 
  One question that arises is whether treatment effects are due to the marketing pitch alone, 
or whether it is crucial that the intervention offered the accounts and account-opening assistance 
at the partner bank. The concern is that the set of marketing pitches implemented might have 
been enough to encourage migrants to exert control over funds in joint accounts that already 
existed or that they could easily set up on their own. Then the intervention’s offer of the joint 
accounts at the partner bank (and account-opening help) may have been superfluous.  
To test this, we use the migrant follow-up survey data to check whether Treatment 3 led 
to increases in savings held jointly by migrants and El Salvador individuals at other (non-partner) 
banks. If the intervention’s offer of assistance opening joint accounts at the partner bank was 
superfluous, and the marketing pitch was all that mattered, then we should also see Treatment 3 
have positive effects on savings at other banks (many of whose branch locations may have been 
more conveniently located for family members in El Salvador).  
Regression results are in Online Appendix Table 5. The dependent variables in the two 
columns are savings reported by the migrant in joint accounts outside the partner bank shared 26 
 
with primary remittance recipients (column 1) and with other people, not including the primary 
remittance recipient (column 2). Dependent variables are expressed as the quartic root in Panel 
A, and in dollars in Panel B. There is no indication that Treatment 3 affects savings in joint 
accounts with primary remittance recipients outside of the partner bank: Treatment 3 coefficients 
in columns 1 or 2 are statistically significantly different from zero. (Interestingly, there does 
seem to be an effect of Treatment 2 on joint savings with non-PRRs outside of the partner bank, 
which is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level.) 
We conclude from this analysis that the marketing pitch alone cannot explain Treatment 
3’s impact on savings at the partner bank, and that it was crucial that the treatment offered actual 
bank accounts and assistance in opening them. 
Longer-term impacts 
Our results so far refer to savings roughly one year after treatment. Outcomes in 
administrative data are average savings balances over the 12 post-treatment months, while 
outcomes in the follow-up survey refer to savings stocks at a point in time about 12 months post-
treatment.  An important question is whether the effects of the treatment extended further in 
time. Because we did not administer further follow-up surveys, this analysis is limited to savings 
outcomes in the administrative data of our partner bank. 
It is important to note that our agreement with the partner bank was that general 
marketing of the new products designed for the project (Cuenta Unidos and Ahorro Directo) 
would be restricted until administration of the follow-up survey. During this period, the new 
products were only offered by our project marketing staff on a face-to-face basis to study 
participants, and there was no marketing of these products to customers more generally. This was 
done to reduce the extent to which marketing spillovers across treatment and comparison groups 
would contaminate (and attenuate) our treatment effect estimates. After the follow-up survey, 
roughly one year after the treatments were administered, the partner bank did begin marketing 
the Cuenta Unidos and Ahorro Directo accounts broadly in both the U.S. and in El Salvador. 
Generalized take-up of the new products could therefore lead all treatment groups to become 
increasingly similar to one another in terms of product usage, preventing the data from revealing 
whether treatment effects persist over time.  
This does turn out to be the case. In Table 6 we examine impacts of the treatments on 
total savings across accounts at the partner bank in 6-month windows up to 48 months post-27 
 
treatment. (In all respects, the regressions are analogous to that of the last column of Table 3, 
except that average savings balances are measured over differing months post-treatment.) Results 
in the first two columns reflect results reported previously in Table 3: there are positive and 
statistically significant effects of Treatment 3 on total partner bank savings in months 1-6 and 
months 7-12 post-treatment, in both the quartic root and dollar specifications. The impact 
persists into months 13-18 post-treatment: the coefficient on Treatment 3 in the quartic 
specification remains positive and statistically significant at the 5% level (although the 
coefficient in the dollar specification has declined somewhat in magnitude and is no longer 
statistically significantly different from zero). In remaining columns of the table, coefficients on 
Treatment 3 in both panels further decline in magnitude, and in no case are they statistically 
significantly different from zero at conventional levels.
37  
These results do not allow us to tell whether the impact of Treatment 3 is truly only 
temporary (lasting no more than 18 months post-treatment), or whether persistent treatment 
impacts are obscured by the fact that the partner bank did market the Cuenta Unidos and Ahorro 
Directo accounts more broadly after the follow-up survey was concluded (roughly 12 months 
after the treatments were administered).
38  
Impact on remittances  
  Increases in savings in El Salvador that we have documented (in response to Treatment 3 
in particular) could either reflect an increase in the recipient savings rate (keeping remittances 
constant) or, alternatively, increases in remittances sent by the migrant. We therefore examine 
impacts of the treatments on remittances sent by the migrant to El Salvador.  
                                                 
37 Online Appendix Figures 1-4 provide month-by-month detail on savings balances by treatment group. Appendix 
Figure 1 displays monthly total savings balances, graphically depicting the pattern found in Table 6: balances in 
Treatment 3 being clearly higher through roughly months 12-18, after which balances in other treatment groups 
catch up. Appendix Figures 2 and 3 display balances in, respectively, joint (Cuenta Unidos) and migrant-only 
(Ahorro Directo) accounts.  For each of these types of accounts offered by the project, it is clear that, after roughly 
the 12
th-18
th month post-treatment, balances rise in the control group and other treatment groups that were not 
originally offered these accounts by our research project. When it comes to savings balances in other accounts at the 
partner bank (shown in Appendix Figure 4), the pattern is slightly different, with Treatments 1 and 2 catching up 
with Treatment 3 but with balances in the control group remaining persistently lower. Overall it appears that catch 
up in the control group after months 12-18 is driven by control group savings in the project accounts (Cuenta Unidos 
and Ahorro Directo). 
38 While not dispositive, the time trend in savings in the comparison group (Treatment 0) is suggestive that the 
partner bank’s broad marketing of these accounts did lead savings in the comparison group to catch up with those in 
the other treatments. The bottom row of Table 6, Panel B displays mean savings in the comparison group, which 
show a distinct rise in the 13-18-month post-treatment period (which appears persistent to later periods), coinciding 
with the timing of the partner bank’s broad marketing of the new accounts. 28 
 
Results are presented in Table 7. Panel A presents main effects of Treatments 3, 2, and 1, 
while Panel B presents separate treatment effects for migrants with and without demand for 
control. The dependent variable in all columns is monthly remittances sent by the migrant.  
The first and second columns of the table examine migrant remittances sent via the 
partner bank in, respectively, the full sample and the sample of migrants completing the follow-
up survey. These are remittances sent to any recipient in El Salvador (we are not able to parse 
out only remittances sent to the primary remittance recipient.)
39 The results in the second column 
are included to facilitate comparison with the third column, which examines remittances to the 
primary remittance recipient via all channels (not just the partner bank), as reported by the 
migrant in the follow-up survey. For neither sample is an identifiable effect of any treatment on 
remittances sent via the partner bank: all coefficients in Panel A are small in magnitude and none 
are statistically significantly different from zero. The same conclusion holds when the dependent 
variable is remittances that migrants report sending to primary remittance recipients in the 
follow-up survey (column 3). In Panel B where separate effects are estimated for migrants with 
and without demand for control, there also is no robust evidence of heterogeneous effects of any 
of the treatments on remittances.  
In the context of our other findings, the lack of impact of the treatments on remittances 
suggests that the increases in savings we found (particularly due to Treatment 3) reflect an 
increase in the savings rate (holding constant the flow of remittances to El Salvador).  
VI. Conclusion 
This paper expands our knowledge about financial decision-making by international 
migrants, and in particular on how they respond to improvements in their ability to monitor and 
control financial decision-making in the origin country. We implemented a field experiment that 
offered US-based Salvadoran migrants bank accounts that varied in the degree to which migrants 
could monitor and control savings in El Salvador-based accounts. We found that the treatment 
that offered migrants the greatest degree of control over El Salvador savings (offering both joint 
accounts and accounts in the migrant’s name alone) led to substantial increases in savings at the 
partner bank. This increase in savings is likely due to enhanced control exerted by migrants; the 
effect of the treatment is significantly larger among migrants who report greater demand for such 
                                                 
39 For the dependent variables in columns 1 and 2, all funds sent to El Salvador are counted as remittances, whether 
retrieved by the recipient in cash or sent directly to a bank account (and whether the bank account is joint with the 
migrant or in the name of someone in El Salvador only). 29 
 
control in the baseline survey. As a caveat, we note that there are no obvious welfare 
implications of our results. Increased control exerted by migrants may not necessarily lead to 
higher well-being on the part of family members in the origin household. Migrants may be 
pursuing objectives that they place in higher regard than do family members back home.  
Another important result of the paper is that simply channeling remittances into bank 
accounts in the home country does not in itself promote savings accumulation. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the fact that one of our treatments – that did not offer joint accounts, and instead 
promoted opening and remitting into bank accounts in the name solely of someone in El 
Salvador – had no identifiable impact on savings. But when migrants are given the ability to 
monitor and control savings in the home country, the impact on savings accumulation is much 
larger. This insight should guide future efforts to facilitate savings accumulation in home-
country households that are connected with international migrants. 
  By showing the effects of an intervention that enhanced migrant control over savings in 
remittance-recipient households, this study also suggests some high-potential directions for 
future research. In particular, it should be fruitful to study the impacts of migrant control over 
other remittance uses that may have positive spillovers and wider development impacts, such as 
payments for schooling, health care, and investments in microenterprises. 
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Treatment 0 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. 10th pct. Median 90th pct. Num. Obs.
Treatment indicators and stratification variables
Treatment 0 (no savings facility offered) 0.24 0.43 0 0 1 898
Treatment 1 (remittance recipient account only) 0.23 0.42 0 0 1 898
Treatment 2 (joint account) 0.27 0.45 0 0 1 898
Treatment 3 (joint + migrant account) 0.25 0.43 0 0 1 898
Migrant is female 0.29 0.45 0 0 1 898
Migrant has US bank account 0.63 0.48 0 1 1 898
Recipient is migrant's parent 0.55 0.50 0 1 1 898
Recipient is migrant's spouse 0.11 0.31 0 0 1 898
Recipient is migrant's child 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 898
Recipient is migrant's other relative 0.30 0.46 0 0 1 898
Migrant has been in US 0-5 years 0.50 0.50 0 0 1 898
Migrant has been in US 6-10 years 0.40 0.49 0 0 1 898
Migrant has been in US 11-15 years 0.11 0.31 0 0 1 898
Baseline variables from DC migrant survey
Migrant's years in the US  5.57 3.60 1 5 11 898
Migrant has El Salvador bank account 0.17 0.38 0 0 1 898
Migrant's annual income (US$) 30,999 56,292 11,700 24,960 48,822 865
Migrant's household's annual income (US$) 39,620 87,551 10,530 31,200 65,000 896
Migrant's years of education 8.53 4.17 2 9 12 865
Migrant's age  30.88 7.65 22 30 41 894
Migrant's annual remittances sent (US$) 4,990 4,124 1,200 3,900 9,600 898
Migrant's total hh savings balance (US$) 2,851 5,111 0 750 8,100 806
Migrant is US citizen 0.007 0.082 0 0 0 894
Migrant hh size in U.S. 4.81 2.15 2 5 8 898
Migrant is married or partnered 0.59 0.49 0 1 1 897
Past experience with direct payments 0.08 0.27 0 0 0 898
Sent funds to El Salvador for others to administer 0.23 0.42 0 0 1 898
Interested in direct payments to increase control 0.21 0.41 0 0 1 898
Aware of disagreements with recipients over remittance uses 0.15 0.35 0 0 1 898
Have had disagreements with recipients over remittance uses 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 898
Demand for control (union of above five indicators) 0.51 0.50 0 1 1 898
Correct answer to compound interest question 0.66 0.47 0 1 1 898
Correct answer to inflation question 0.64 0.48 0 1 1 898
Correct answer to mutual fund question 0.37 0.48 0 0 1 898
Tracks spending and budgets expenses 0.46 0.50 0 0 1 897
Baseline variables from El Salvador household survey
Recipient's total hh savings balance (US$) 382 1,732 0 0 380 733
Recipient's annual remittances received (US$) 3,182 2,787 900 2,400 6,000 725
Pre-treatment savings at partner bank
Savings balance, average over 12 months prior to treatment-quartic (US$)  1.02 2.08 0 0 4.45 898
Savings balance, average over 12 months prior to treatment (US$)  243 1,085 0 0 391 898
Notes:   Survey data collected from Jun 2007 to Jan 2008 among Salvadoran migrants in Washington DC and from Nov 2007 to Jun 2008 among households in El 
Salvador identified as DC migrant's "primary remittance recipient".Table 2: Impact of treatments on account ownership at partner bank
(Ordinary least-squares estimates)
Dependent variable: Indicator for existence of given type of account at partner bank during 12 months post-treatment
Treatment 3 (joint account + 0.221*** 0.204*** 0.234*** 0.238*** 0.020 0.014
                    migrant-only account) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.042) (0.041)
Treatment 2 (joint account) 0.141*** 0.125*** -0.025 -0.018 -0.003 0.006
(0.030) (0.031) (0.016) (0.017) (0.041) (0.040)
Treatment 1 (PRR account only) 0.150*** 0.135*** -0.013 -0.006 -0.027 -0.028
(0.032) (0.032) (0.018) (0.018) (0.042) (0.040)
Constant 0.059*** 0.557*** 0.041*** 0.250 0.265*** 0.715***
(0.016) (0.191) (0.013) (0.164) (0.030) (0.243)
Control variables Y Y Y
Observations 898 898 898 898 898 898
R-squared 0.041 0.145 0.141 0.217 0.001 0.078
P-value of F-test: equality of …
   Treatment 3 & 2 coeffs. 0.046 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.591 0.858
   Treatment 3 & 1 coeffs. 0.088 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.274 0.316
   Treatment 2 & 1 coeffs. 0.819 0.784 0.391 0.450 0.555 0.401
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Other accounts in name of 
migrant or primary 
remittance recipient (PRR)
Cuenta Unidos accounts (in 
name of someone in El 
Salvador)*
Ahorro Directo accounts (in 
name of migrant only)
Notes: Dependent variable equal to 1 if migrant or remittance recipient has given type of project account with partner bank (Banco 
Agricola), 0 otherwise. Omitted treatment indicator is for Treatment 0 (comparison group). Control variables include: marketer fixed 
effects are for the specific individual (out of 9) who conducted the marketing visit; stratification cell fixed effects for each of 48 unique 
combinations of stratification variables: gender (male/female), having a US bank account (yes/no), relationship to remittance recipient 
(parent/child/spouse/other), and years in US category (0-5 years/6-10 years/11-15 years); treatment month fixed effects; indicator for 
migrant demand for control. Treatment months are Nov 2007 through Jul 2008 inclusive. 
*Cuenta Unidos accounts opened with project assistance in Treatments 2 and 3 are all joint accounts shared by migrants and someone in El 
Salvador, while those opened in Treatment 1 are all accounts in name of primary remittance recipient (PRR) only. Some Cuenta Unidos 
accounts may have been opened without project assistance in any of the treatment groups, and in these cases the accounts may be in the 
name of PRRs alone or joint between migrants and someone in El Salvador.
(a) (b) (c)Table 3: Impact of treatments on savings in accounts at partner bank
(Ordinary least-squares estimates)
Dependent variable: Savings balance (US$), average over 12 months post-treatment, in accounts of given type
Panel A (quartic root)
Treatment 3 (joint account + 0.387*** 0.354*** 0.281*** 0.305*** 0.282 0.206 0.705*** 0.639***
                    migrant-only account) (0.108) (0.114) (0.089) (0.094) (0.198) (0.192) (0.215) (0.212)
Treatment 2 (joint account) 0.232** 0.231** -0.079** -0.057 0.035 -0.006 0.110 0.102
(0.101) (0.109) (0.039) (0.047) (0.177) (0.178) (0.193) (0.198)
Treatment 1 (PRR account only) 0.184** 0.162* -0.012 -0.004 -0.084 -0.122 0.044 0.001
(0.092) (0.088) (0.051) (0.051) (0.179) (0.180) (0.193) (0.195)
Constant 0.176*** 0.920 0.079** 0.004 0.887*** 2.747** 1.119*** 2.818**
(0.055) (0.628) (0.039) (0.131) (0.124) (1.183) (0.133) (1.184)
Control variables Y Y Y Y
Observations 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898
R-squared 0.013 0.087 0.037 0.117 0.004 0.064 0.016 0.082
P-value of F-test: equality of …
   Treatment 3 & 2 coeffs. 0.214 0.334 0.000 0.000 0.220 0.305 0.008 0.017
   Treatment 3 & 1 coeffs. 0.088 0.101 0.001 0.000 0.072 0.105 0.003 0.004
   Treatment 2 & 1 coeffs. 0.671 0.555 0.048 0.091 0.514 0.531 0.741 0.624
Mean of dep. var. in comparison group 0.176 0.079 0.887 1.119
Panel B (in dollars)
Treatment 3 (joint account + 79.770 106.543 28.978* 32.533* 187.826* 142.479 296.574** 281.555**
                    migrant-only account) (68.482) (83.989) (15.166) (17.131) (106.129) (101.002) (126.380) (132.572)
Treatment 2 (joint account) 70.062 94.661* -9.074 -6.996 86.995 25.354 147.983 113.018
(45.054) (55.237) (6.920) (8.159) (109.439) (110.911) (119.543) (126.260)
Treatment 1 (PRR account only) 12.693 27.980 -5.605 -5.802 38.339 1.988 45.426 24.166
(13.961) (21.121) (7.211) (8.338) (101.573) (102.704) (102.511) (105.030)
Constant 16.005* 240.552 9.074 6.610 160.836*** 382.230 185.914*** 629.391*
(8.469) (163.721) (6.920) (15.665) (56.859) (317.066) (57.586) (366.516)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y
Observations 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898
R-squared 0.003 0.035 0.017 0.087 0.003 0.069 0.006 0.056
P-value of F-test: equality of …
   Treatment 3 & 2 coeffs. 0.905 0.893 0.005 0.008 0.435 0.357 0.332 0.285
   Treatment 3 & 1 coeffs. 0.329 0.280 0.012 0.015 0.223 0.243 0.074 0.069
   Treatment 2 & 1 coeffs. 0.208 0.197 0.094 0.713 0.700 0.861 0.448 0.540
Mean of dep. var. in comparison group 16.005 9.074 160.836 185.914
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(a) (b) (c)
Notes: Dependent variables are averaged over end-of-month balances in US dollars. See Table 2 for other notes.
(d) = (a) + (b) + (c)
*Cuenta Unidos accounts opened with project assistance in Treatments 2 and 3 are all joint accounts shared by migrants and someone in El Salvador, while those 
opened in Treatment 1 are all accounts in name of primary remittance recipient (PRR) only. Some Cuenta Unidos accounts may have been opened without project 
assistance in any of the treatment groups, and in these cases the accounts may be in the name of PRRs alone or joint between migrants and someone in El Salvador.
Other accounts (in name of 
migrant or primary 
remittance recipient)
Cuenta Unidos accounts (in 
name of someone in El 
Salvador)*
Ahorro Directo accounts (in 
name of migrant only)
In total across all accountsTable 4: Impact of treatments on savings reported by migrants in follow-up survey
(Ordinary least-squares estimates)
Dependent variable: Savings reported in follow-up survey (Mar - Jun 2009)
Panel A (quartic root)
Treatment 3 (joint account +
                    migrant-only account)
Treatment 2 (joint account)




P-value of F-test: equality of …
   Treatment 3 & 2 coeffs.
   Treatment 3 & 1 coeffs.
   Treatment 2 & 1 coeffs.
Mean of dep. var. in comparison group
Panel B (in dollars)
Treatment 3 (joint account +
                    migrant-only account)
Treatment 2 (joint account)




P-value of F-test: equality of …
   Treatment 3 & 2 coeffs.
   Treatment 3 & 1 coeffs.
   Treatment 2 & 1 coeffs.
Mean of dep. var. in comparison group
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(d) = (a) + (b) + 
0.629 1.573 0.552 2.567
0.442 0.873 0.949 0.443
0.734 0.186 0.048 0.874
0.636 0.156 0.079 0.556
(0.436)










0.366 0.711* -0.445** 0.516
(0.302) (0.387) (0.197) (0.436)
0.239 0.173 -0.066 0.266




Notes: Follow-up survey administered from Mar - Jun 2009. Dependent variable is stock of savings in US dollars. 
Omitted treatment indicator is for Treatment 0 (comparison group). Control variables include: marketer fixed 
effects are for the specific individual (out of 9) who conducted the marketing visit; stratification cell fixed effects 
for each of 48 unique combinations of stratification variables: gender (male/female), having a US bank account 
(yes/no), relationship to remittance recipient (parent/child/spouse/other), and years in US category (0-5 years/6-10 
years/11-15 years); treatment month fixed effects; indicator for migrant demand for control. Treatment months are 

















Savings in El 
Salvador









0.463 0.227 -0.080 0.581
(0.316) (0.360) (0.202)Table 5: Heterogeneity in treatment effects by baseline demand for control
(Ordinary least-squares estimates)
Dependent variable: Savings balance (US$), average over 12 months post-treatment, in accounts of given type
Cuenta Unidos accounts (in 
name of someone in El 
Salvador)
Ahorro Directo accounts 
(in name of migrant only)
Other accounts (in name of 
migrant or primary 
remittance recipient)
In total across all accounts
(a) (b) (c) (d) = (a)+(b)+(c)
Panel A (quartic root)
Treatment 3 * Demand for control 0.572*** 0.113 0.331 0.768***
(0.171) (0.110) (0.261) (0.293)
Treatment 3 * No demand for control 0.117 0.511*** 0.070 0.497*
(0.135) (0.146) (0.279) (0.302)
Treatment 2 * Demand for control 0.478*** -0.119* 0.047 0.283
(0.161) (0.072) (0.254) (0.286)
Treatment 2 * No demand for control -0.022 0.009 -0.054 -0.074
(0.134) (0.044) (0.256) (0.275)
Treatment 1 * Demand for control 0.121 -0.114 -0.355 -0.340
(0.110) (0.076) (0.231) (0.253)
Treatment 1 * No demand for control 0.186 0.114* 0.099 0.326
(0.140) (0.066) (0.277) (0.298)
Control Variables YYYY
Observations 898 898 898 898
R-Squared 0.098 0.126 0.068 0.090
P-value of F-test: equality of interactions with
  Treatment 3 0.031 0.025 0.490 0.516
  Treatment 2 0.014 0.100 0.783 0.372
  Treatment 1 0.722 0.024 0.209 0.091
Mean of dep. var. in comparison group
   Migrants with demand for control 0.086 0.129 0.923 1.113
   Migrants with no demand for control 0.277 0.022 0.85 1.13
Panel B (in dollars)
Treatment 3 * Demand for control 189.768 -4.669 299.785** 484.884**
(148.826) (14.858) (130.469) (199.087)
Treatment 3 * No demand for control 16.499 72.243** -27.013 61.729
(27.879) (29.198) (148.808) (153.673)
Treatment 2 * Demand for control 162.918* -17.819 118.489 263.588*
(98.902) (12.954) (111.959) (155.977)
Treatment 2 * No demand for control 24.894 4.335 -67.874 -38.645
(35.275) (6.938) (195.811) (198.076)
Treatment 1 * Demand for control 14.106 -18.008 -65.784 -69.687
(22.881) (14.363) (96.316) (98.699)
Treatment 1 * No demand for control 36.222 7.967 59.510 103.699
(30.408) (6.471) (168.831) (171.613)
Control Variables YYYY
Observations 898 898 898 898
R-Squared 0.039 0.101 0.074 0.062
P-value of F-test: equality of interactions with
  Treatment 3 0.212 0.013 0.089 0.077
  Treatment 2 0.173 0.098 0.411 0.228
  Treatment 1 0.541 0.086 0.494 0.352
Mean of dep. var. in comparison group
   Migrants with demand for control 13.637 16.907 94.118 124.662
   Migrants with no demand for control 18.672 0.252 235.974 254.898
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Dependent variables are averaged over end-of-month balances in US dollars. Regressions  need not include main effects of Treatments 3, 2 and 1 
because they are fully interacted with "demand for control" and "no demand for control". See Table 2 for other notes.Table 6: Impact of treatments on savings at partner bank, over time
(Ordinary least-squares estimates)
Dependent variable: Savings balance (US$), average over given months post-treatment, in total across all partner bank accounts
Post-treatment months: 1-6 7-12 13-18 19-24 25-30 31-36 37-42 43-48
Panel A (quartic root)
Treatment 3 (joint account + 0.634*** 0.626*** 0.475** 0.326 0.275 0.322 0.255 0.212
                    indiv. migrant account) (0.207) (0.214) (0.221) (0.206) (0.207) (0.210) (0.207) (0.218)
Treatment 2 (joint account) 0.143 0.091 -0.047 -0.045 -0.091 -0.119 -0.122 -0.125
(0.195) (0.197) (0.196) (0.193) (0.197) (0.201) (0.199) (0.206)
Treatment 1 (remittance recipient 0.056 -0.058 -0.137 -0.172 -0.150 -0.131 -0.096 -0.204
                     account) (0.190) (0.192) (0.200) (0.203) (0.212) (0.223) (0.220) (0.221)
Control Variables YYYYYYYY
Observations 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898
R-squared 0.083 0.082 0.074 0.067 0.064 0.068 0.070 0.070
P-value of F-test: equality of …
   Treatment 3 & 2 coeffs. 0.028 0.016 0.017 0.075 0.075 0.033 0.074 0.127
   Treatment 3 & 1 coeffs. 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.024 0.061 0.052 0.132 0.079
   Treatment 2 & 1 coeffs. 0.671 0.463 0.655 0.544 0.787 0.958 0.903 0.714
Mean of dep. var. in comparison group 1.051 1.056 1.124 1.122 1.112 1.112 1.083 1.152
Panel B (in dollars)
Treatment 3 (joint account + 277.787** 285.323* 211.905 213.830 153.626 31.484 20.687 31.584
                    indiv. migrant account) (120.166) (156.322) (227.437) (219.450) (211.533) (169.174) (220.522) (274.700)
Treatment 2 (joint account) 152.104 73.933 -32.024 37.460 25.950 -35.547 -64.035 -111.047
(122.947) (135.507) (122.470) (129.029) (170.891) (201.742) (215.868) (238.924)
Treatment 1 (remittance recipient 40.049 8.284 7.155 107.273 203.372 178.405 142.401 56.479
                     account) (96.619) (119.421) (126.208) (127.078) (183.632) (215.878) (210.993) (228.290)
Control Variables YYYYYYYY
Observations 898 898 898 898 898 898 898 898
R-squared 0.061 0.051 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.048 0.045 0.046
P-value of F-test: equality of …
   Treatment 3 & 2 coeffs. 0.422 0.207 0.234 0.401 0.546 0.674 0.692 0.591
   Treatment 3 & 1 coeffs. 0.079 0.077 0.302 0.603 0.833 0.471 0.572 0.922
   Treatment 2 & 1 coeffs. 0.433 0.663 0.741 0.622 0.432 0.366 0.338 0.443
Mean of dep. var. in comparison group 165.620 206.209 288.509 230.890 248.745 301.652 304.683 357.046
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Dependent variables are averaged over end-of-month balances in US dollars. Omitted treatment indicator is for Treatment 0 (comparison group). Control 
variables include: marketer fixed effects are for the specific individual (out of 9) who conducted the marketing visit; stratification cell fixed effects for each of 
48 unique combinations of stratification variables: gender (male/female), having a US bank account (yes/no), relationship to remittance recipient 
(parent/child/spouse/other), and years in US category (0-5 years/6-10 years/11-15 years); treatment month fixed effects; indicator for migrant demand for 
control. Treatment months are Nov 2007 through Jul 2008 inclusive. Table 7: Impact of treatments on remittances (sent into bank accounts or as cash)
(Ordinary least-squares estimates)
Dependent variable: 
Remittance recipient: Anyone in El Salvador Anyone in El Salvador Primary remittance recipient
Remittance channel: Partner bank Partner bank All channels
Time Frame: July 2008 to June 2009 July 2008 to June 2009







Data Source: Partner bank database Partner bank database Follow-up survey
Panel A: Main effect of treatments
Treatment 3 (joint account + 10.659 18.132 35.940
                    migrant-only account) (18.778) (24.477) (52.405)
Treatment 2 (joint account) -20.180 -9.358 -2.078
(16.061) (19.391) (33.161)
Treatment 1 (PRR account only) -24.121 -31.648 5.365
(16.270) (20.926) (37.339)
Control variables YYY
Observations 898 560 560
R-squared 0.149 0.199 0.092
P-value of F-test: equality of …
   Treatment 3 & 2 coeffs. 0.081 0.236 0.391
   Treatment 3 & 1 coeffs. 0.053 0.035 0.528
   Treatment 2 & 1 coeffs. 0.781 0.261 0.810
Mean of dep. var. in comparison group 71.283 82.423 239.954
Panel B: Separate treatment effects for migrants with and without baseline demand for control
Treatment 3 * Demand for control -5.036 -8.904 -10.517
(29.416) (33.463) (53.487)
Treatment 3 * No demand for control 27.516 47.373 88.036
(20.963) (31.321) (86.988)
Treatment 2 * Demand for control -30.120 -2.136 -15.025
(27.596) (32.783) (57.674)
Treatment 2 * No demand for control -9.584 -15.412 12.517
(16.446) (25.576) (38.312)
Treatment 1 * Demand for control -36.302 -59.460* 2.512
(27.427) (31.719) 61.83
Treatment 1 * No demand for control -11.237 -1.655 14.382
(19.254) (31.352) (36.958)
Control variables YYY
Observations 898 560 560
R-squared 0.150 0.204 0.094
P-value of F-test: equality of interactions with
  Treatment 3 0.355 0.193 0.310
  Treatment 2 0.529 0.765 0.703
  Treatment 1 0.469 0.222 0.812
Mean of dep. var. in comparison group
   Migrants with demand for control 91.473 99.412 277.754
   Migrants with no demand for control 48.545 62.213 194.986
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Monthly remittances sent by migrant
Notes -- Dependent variables are monthly remittances in US dollars. For the dependent variables in columns 1 and 2, all funds sent to El 
Salvador are counted as remittances, whether retrieved by the recipient in cash or sent directly to a bank account. Follow-up survey 
administered from Mar - Jun 2009. Omitted treatment indicator is for Treatment 0 (comparison group). Control variables include: marketer 
fixed effects are for the specific individual (out of 9) who conducted the marketing visit; stratification cell fixed effects for each of 48 unique 
combinations of stratification variables: gender (male/female), having a US bank account (yes/no), relationship to remittance recipient 
(parent/child/spouse/other), and years in US category (0-5 years/6-10 years/11-15 years); treatment month fixed effects; indicator for migrant 
demand for control. Treatment months are Nov 2007 through Jul 2008 inclusive. 1 
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Appendix A: Marketing Scripts for Treatments 0, 1, 2, and 3 
 
Treatment 0: comparison group, not offered any new savings accounts or account-opening 
assistance 
 
Initiate conversation with questions regarding client’s preferences for money sending and saving 
services. For example: 
  Do your family members currently save money? 
  Which service providers do they currently utilize to send money? 
  What type of transfer do you use, traditional remittance (with code/password) or 
remittance by credit to an account?  
  Why do you use these services? 
  What difficulties does your family member have in picking up/receiving the 
money that you send? 
 
If they send money through traditional remittance (with code/password): 
Did you know that besides sending money to your family via traditional remittance, there is a 
more practical, less costly option?    
 
The option to which I am referring is “remittance by credit to an account”.  Let me explain why 
this option offers more advantages than a traditional remittance.  
 
As you may know, when you send money via a traditional remittance, your family receives a 
code or password to take to a Banco Agrícola branch and wait in line to receive the remittance. 
By contrast, when you send money via a “remittance by credit to an account”, you obtain the 
following advantages: 
 
  Access to funds through a debit card: Your remittance recipient can access the funds in the 
account through a debit card.  This way, should your remittance recipient need money 
immediately you will no longer have to worry about going to send money right away since 
he/she will now have money available in this account.   
  Direct deposit of your remittance to this account: Remitting into an account facilitates your 
remittance recipient receiving the money you send:  no longer will he/she have to go to the 
bank and wait in line to receive it or run the risk of losing the code/pin number.  He/she 
can use any ATM to take out money using a debit card from anywhere in El Salvador.   
 
 
Treatment 1: offer of remittance recipient account 2 
 
 
Initiate conversation with questions regarding client’s preferences for money sending and saving 
services. For example: 
  Do your family members currently save money? 
  Which service providers do they currently utilize to send money? 
  What type of transfer do you use, traditional remittance (with code/password) or 
remittance by credit to an account?  
  Why do you use these services? 
  What difficulties does your family member have in picking up/receiving the 
money that you send? 
 
I come to present to you a service which will allow your remittance recipient to obtain a savings 
account courtesy of Banco Agrícola.  This account offers you the following advantages:  
 
  Savings for your remittance recipient in El Salvador: Your remittance recipient will be able 
to open a savings account in his/her name in El Salvador through Banco Agrícola.  
  Access to funds through a debit card: Your remittance recipient can access the funds in the 
account through a debit card.  This way, should your remittance recipient need money 
immediately you will no longer have to worry about going to send money right away since 
he/she will now have money available in this account.   
  Direct deposit of your remittance to this account: Remitting into an account facilitates your 
remittance recipient receiving the money you send:  no longer will he/she have to go to the 
bank and wait in line to receive it or run the risk of losing the code/pin number.  He/she 
can use any ATM to take out money using a debit card from anywhere in El Salvador.   
 
 
Treatment 2: offer of joint account (Cuenta Unidos) 
 
Initiate conversation with questions regarding client’s preferences for money sending and saving 
services. For example: 
  Do your family members currently save money? 
  Which service providers do they currently utilize to send money? 
  What type of transfer do you use, traditional remittance (with code/password) or 
remittance by credit to an account?  
  Why do you use these services? 
  What difficulties does your family member have in picking up/receiving the 
money that you send? 
 
I come to present to you a service which will allow your remittance recipient to obtain a “Cuenta 
Unidos” courtesy of Banco Agrícola.  This account offers you the following advantages:  
 
  Savings for your remittance recipient in El Salvador: Your remittance recipient will be able 
to open a savings account in his/her name in El Salvador through Banco Agrícola.  
  Both your remittance recipient and you will be able to verify the balance on the account: 
This account will allow you to check the balance on the account through a service provided 
by a call center.  3 
 
  Access to funds for you and your remittance recipient through a debit card: Both you and 
your remittance recipient will have access to the funds in the account through a debit card.  
This way, should your remittance recipient need money immediately you will no longer 
have to worry about going to send money right away since he/she will now have money 
available in this account.  Likewise, should you need money in the United States, you will 
also have access to funds from this account through the use of this debit card.    
  Direct deposit of your remittance to this account: Remitting into an account facilitates your 
remittance recipient receiving the money you send:  no longer will he/she have to go to the 
bank and wait in line to receive it or run the risk of losing the code/pin number.  He/she 
can use any ATM to take out money using a debit card from anywhere in El Salvador.   
 
 
Treatment 3: offer of joint account (Cuenta Unidos) and migrant-only account (Ahorro Directo) 
 
Initiate conversation with questions regarding client’s preferences for money sending and saving 
services. For example: 
  Do your family members currently save money? 
  Which service providers do they currently utilize to send money? 
  What type of transfer do you use, traditional remittance (with code/password) or 
remittance by credit to an account?  
  Why do you use these services? 
  What difficulties does your family member have in picking up/receiving the 
money that you send? 
 
I come to present to you a service which will allow your remittance recipient to obtain a “Cuenta 
Unidos” courtesy of Banco Agrícola.  This account offers you the following advantages:  
 
  Savings for your remittance recipient in El Salvador: Your remittance recipient will be able 
to open a savings account in his/her name in El Salvador through Banco Agrícola.  
  Both your remittance recipient and you will be able to verify the balance on the account: 
This account will allow you to check the balance on the account through a service provided 
by a call center.  
  Access to funds for you and your remittance recipient through a debit card: Both you and 
your remittance recipient will have access to the funds in the account through a debit card.  
This way, should your remittance recipient need money immediately you will no longer 
have to worry about going to send money right away since he/she will now have money 
available in this account.  Likewise, should you need money in the United States, you will 
also have access to funds from this account through the use of this debit card.    
  Direct deposit of your remittance to this account: Remitting into an account facilitates your 
remittance recipient receiving the money you send:  no longer will he/she have to go to the 
bank and wait in line to receive it or run the risk of losing the code/pin number.  He/she 
can use any ATM to take out money using a debit card from anywhere in El Salvador.   
 
Present Ahorro Directo: 
As part of this promotion, with the opening of a “Cuenta Unidos”, you will also have the option 
of opening a private individual account, “Ahorro Directo”, over which no one but yourself will 4 
 
have access or control, not even the person you are sharing Cuenta Unidos with.  No one else 
except you will be able to check account balances or make withdrawals from this account, and 
no one else has to know that this account exists. It is exclusively yours.  
 
Before describing the benefits of this account, let me ask you a few questions. Consult with the 
client’s preferences and experiences in regards to the management of his/her money. For 
example: 
  How much control do you have over the management of your finances in El 
Salvador? 
  Do you save money now?  How do you keep those savings? Do you save in the 
US or in El Salvador?  
  What methods do you use to access your funds when you visit El Salvador?  
  Have you considered the convenience of having a savings account in El Salvador 
for the future? 
 
With the Ahorro Directo, you will have exclusive control over your money in El Salvador.  This 
product will be very beneficial to you in the management of your finances for the following 
reasons:  
 
  You will have the power to personally manage your money in El Salvador:  You will have 
the opportunity to open a savings account in El Salvador in your name from here, over 
which only you will have access or control. 
  You will never again have to use an intermediary to save money for you: If you save 
money through money transfers to your family or friends, with the opening of this account 
you will be able to make money transfers directly to your account without having to ask 
someone else any favors. In other words, you will be sending remittances to your own 
account instead of sending to someone else.   
  You will benefit from the added security: Through the use of this product you will have 
access to your money in El Salvador as well as in the United States. This offers you 
important advantages, since you will not only be saving for your future, but you will also 
have the money available from any Banco Agricola branch in El Salvador in case you 
travel to El Salvador. In addition, this account includes a debit card, so you will no longer 
have to carry large amounts of cash with you to El Salvador, improving your personal 
security. 
  It will be easy for you to check your account balance: This account will also allow you to 
check your balance through a call center.   
 
 
  5 
 
Appendix Figure 1: Total savings balances at partner bank, by post-treatment month 
 
Notes: Variable depicted is savings balance (US$, end of month) in given month since treatment, in total across all 
partner bank accounts. T1=treatment 1 (PRR account only), T2=treatment 2 (joint account), T3=treatment 3 (joint 
account + migrant-only account). 
 
Appendix Figure 2: Joint account (Cuenta Unidos) savings balances at partner bank, by 
post-treatment month 
 
Notes: Variable depicted is joint account (Cuenta Unidos) savings balance (US$, end of month) in given month 



































































































Appendix Figure 3: Migrant-only account (Ahorro Directo) savings balances at partner 
bank, by post-treatment month 
 
Notes: Variable depicted is migrant-only account (Ahorro Directo) savings balance (US$, end of month) in given 
month since treatment. See Appendix Figure 1 for other notes. 
 
Appendix Figure 4: Savings balances in other accounts at partner bank, by post-treatment 
month 
 
Notes: Variable depicted is savings balance (US$, end of month) in given month since treatment in other accounts 






































































































T3Appendix Table 1: Comparison of means, study participants vs. DC-area Salvadorans and Hispanics in US Census
Data source:      Baseline survey
Sample restriction:      Salvadoran-born
Salvadoran-born, 
not US citizen
Hispanic, not US 
citizen
Fraction male 0.71 0.57 0.57 0.57
Panel A: Men
Age 30.34 30.34 30.25 30.62
(7.36) (8.87) (8.84) (9.13)
Migrant has been in US 0-5 years 0.49 0.33 0.35 0.45
Migrant has been in US 6-10 years 0.40 0.29 0.29 0.28
Migrant has been in US 11-15 years 0.10 0.38 0.36 0.27
No Education 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.09
Some Education, no degree 0.63 0.60 0.61 0.52
High School Degree or more 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.39
Migrant is US citizen 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00
Migrant is married or partnered 0.53 0.45 0.44 0.47
Sample Size 638 1,933 1,735 4,427
Panel B: Women
Age 32.20 31.71 31.66 32.59
(8.19) (9.52) (9.42) (9.98)
Migrant has been in US 0-5 years 0.51 0.29 0.31 0.40
Migrant has been in US 6-10 years 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.32
Migrant has been in US 11-15 years 0.12 0.37 0.34 0.28
No Education 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.08
Some Education, no degree 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.46
High School Degree or more 0.36 0.30 0.27 0.46
Migrant is US citizen 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00
Migrant is married or partnered 0.73 0.57 0.57 0.59
Sample Size 260 1,453 1,259 3,263
US Census 2000
Note: US Census 2000 data are IPUMS 5% sample, restricted to individuals aged 18-65 in the metro Washington DC area 
(including MD and VA suburbs). All variables other than age are indicator variables. Standard deviation in parentheses for 
age variable. Appendix Table 2: Means of variables by treatment group
0123
T0 = T1 = T2 
= T3
T1 = T0 T2 = T0 T3 = T0 Num. of Obs.
Baseline stratification variables
Migrant is female 0.26 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.556 0.226 0.266 0.720 898
Migrant has US bank account 0.61 0.61 0.66 0.63 0.590 0.883 0.209 0.676 898
Recipient is migrant's parent 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.949 0.998 0.740 0.802 898
Recipient is migrant's spouse 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.317 0.104 0.331 0.093 898
Recipient is migrant's child 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.480 0.757 0.185 0.343 898
Recipient is migrant's other relative 0.26 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.326 0.184 0.091 0.163 898
Migrant has been in US 0-5 years 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.811 0.604 0.389 0.919 898
Migrant has been in US 6-10 years 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.38 0.893 0.729 0.638 0.824 898
Migrant has been in US 11-15 years 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.927 0.768 0.523 0.611 898
Baseline survey variables
Migrant's years in the US  5.42 5.47 5.76 5.59 0.764 0.904 0.330 0.635 898
Migrant has El Salvador bank account 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.500 0.632 0.571 0.329 898
Migrant's annual income (US$) 30,669 36,587 29,108 28,109 0.555 0.452 0.481 0.285 865
Migrant's household's annual income (US$) 36,355 42,264 42,376 37,319 0.782 0.448 0.466 0.736 896
Migrant's years of education 8.62 8.15 8.94 8.35 0.213 0.271 0.415 0.506 865
Migrant's age  30.61 31.05 31.02 30.84 0.929 0.567 0.553 0.761 894
Migrant's annual remittances sent (US$) 5,451 4,876 4,689 4,974 0.314 0.187 0.062 0.268 898
Migrant's total hh savings balance (US$) 2,942 3,080 2,544 2,883 0.747 0.796 0.415 0.905 806
Migrant is US citizen 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.112 0.317 0.083 0.156 894
Migrant hh size in U.S. 4.72 5.07 4.84 4.62 0.198 0.104 0.546 0.625 898
Migrant is married or partnered 0.54 0.58 0.62 0.60 0.329 0.467 0.075 0.211 897
Past experience with direct payments 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.940 0.898 0.743 0.792 898
Sent funds to El Salvador for others to administer 0.23 0.20 0.25 0.24 0.525 0.344 0.665 0.860 898
Interested in direct payments to increase control 0.21 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.695 0.489 0.893 0.622 898
Aware of disagreements with recipients over remittance uses 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.768 0.633 0.537 0.289 898
Have had disagreements with recipients over remittance uses 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.433 0.257 0.976 0.587 898
Demand for control (union of above five indicators) 0.53 0.49 0.49 0.52 0.749 0.414 0.368 0.840 898
Correct answer to compound interest question 0.64 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.841 0.691 0.581 0.366 898
Correct answer to inflation question 0.61 0.66 0.63 0.68 0.518 0.332 0.667 0.160 898
Correct answer to mutual fund question 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.490 0.399 0.121 0.360 898
Tracks spending and budgets expenses 0.46 0.50 0.43 0.46 0.617 0.480 0.531 0.982 897
Baseline variables from El Salvador household survey
Recipient's total hh savings balance (US$) 249 543 274 459 0.305 0.114 0.846 0.217 733
Recipient's annual remittances received (US$) 3136 3112 3244 3224 0.957 0.929 0.731 0.769 725
Pre-treatment savings at partner bank
Quartic root of savings balance, average over 12 months prior to treatment 0.97 0.97 0.94 1.18 0.621 0.963 0.896 0.283 898
Savings balance, average over 12 months prior to treatment (US$)  229 232 200 315 0.711 0.980 0.767 0.393 898
Attrition from follow-up survey
Attrition from US follow up savings data 0.49 0.45 0.39 0.42 0.132 0.451 0.024 0.133 898
P-value of F-test … Treatment group
Notes -- Table presents means of key variables for each treatment group prior to treatment. P-value is for F-test of equality of means across treatment groups.  The first 9 variables listed in table are stratification variables: migrants were 
first sorted into 48 cells (based on gender, US bank account ownership, relationship to remittance recipient, and years on US category) before randomization into treatments 0, 1, 2, or 3. Savings figures reported in US dollars. Appendix Table 3: Means of variables by treatment group, follow-up survey sample
0123
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Migrant is female 0.29 0.28 0.33 0.29 0.761 0.903 0.408 0.941 508
Migrant has US bank account 0.58 0.63 0.67 0.64 0.553 0.408 0.150 0.333 508
Recipient is migrant's parent 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.790 0.940 0.750 0.408 508
Recipient is migrant's spouse 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.438 0.219 0.102 0.305 508
Recipient is migrant's child 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.168 0.570 0.062 0.255 508
Recipient is migrant's other relative 0.24 0.32 0.34 0.27 0.251 0.179 0.077 0.642 508
Migrant has been in US 0-5 years 0.49 0.47 0.44 0.52 0.607 0.748 0.413 0.666 508
Migrant has been in US 6-10 years 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.37 0.656 0.809 0.445 0.675 508
Migrant has been in US 11-15 years 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.998 0.897 0.924 0.971 508
Baseline survey variables
Migrant's years in the US  5.59 5.58 5.75 5.73 0.975 0.989 0.725 0.778 508
Migrant has El Salvador bank account 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.21 0.465 0.930 0.520 0.381 508
Migrant's annual income (US$) 30,297 41,590 29,034 28,447 0.786 0.420 0.715 0.635 490
Migrant's household's annual income (US$) 34,996 50,717 34,425 39,389 0.385 0.258 0.859 0.303 508
Migrant's years of education 8.46 8.03 8.63 8.56 0.698 0.453 0.744 0.863 491
Migrant's age  31.08 32.21 31.10 31.00 0.600 0.292 0.988 0.937 505
Migrant's annual remittances sent (US$) 5,335 5,532 4,855 5,197 0.583 0.758 0.397 0.821 508
Migrant's total hh savings balance (US$) 2,731 3,097 1,907 2,819 0.138 0.630 0.141 0.892 469
Migrant is US citizen 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.224 1.000 0.157 0.316 505
Migrant hh size in U.S. 4.87 5.21 4.98 4.50 0.095 0.271 0.665 0.187 508
Migrant is married or partnered 0.57 0.58 0.62 0.62 0.811 0.862 0.427 0.459 508
Past experience with direct payments 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.831 0.773 0.461 0.411 508
Sent funds to El Salvador for others to administer 0.25 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.747 0.363 0.851 0.973 508
Interested in direct payments to increase control 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.468 0.481 0.540 0.467 508
Aware of disagreements with recipients over remittance uses 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.960 0.651 0.758 0.615 508
Have had disagreements with recipients over remittance uses 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.507 0.617 0.993 0.372 508
Demand for control (union of above five indicators) 0.53 0.50 0.45 0.55 0.419 0.733 0.237 0.724 508
Correct answer to compound interest question 0.60 0.71 0.67 0.67 0.330 0.066 0.214 0.239 508
Correct answer to inflation question 0.62 0.60 0.63 0.66 0.808 0.805 0.773 0.510 508
Correct answer to mutual fund question 0.37 0.37 0.31 0.36 0.715 0.903 0.374 0.905 508
Tracks spending and budgets expenses 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.935 0.928 0.968 0.578 508
Baseline variables from El Salvador household survey
Recipient's total hh savings balance (US$) 273 684 336 584 0.392 0.147 0.745 0.234 428
Recipient's annual remittances received (US$) 2,988 3,371 3,474 3,525 0.501 0.293 0.221 0.179 426
Pre-treatment savings at partner bank
Quartic root of savings balance, average over 12 months prior to treatment 0.64 1.03 0.98 1.27 0.094 0.109 0.133 0.016 508
Savings balance, average over 12 months prior to treatment (US$)  161 204 233 344 0.558 0.712 0.611 0.162 508
Treatment group P-value of F-test …
Notes -- Table presents means of key variables for each treatment group prior to treatment, for observations that have valid savings data in migrant follow-up survey. See previous table for other notes.Appendix Table 4: Impact of treatments on savings in accounts at partner bank in follow-up sample (N=508)
(Ordinary least-squares estimates)
Dependent variable: Savings balance (US$), average over 12 months post-treatment, in accounts of given type
Panel A (quartic root)
Treatment 3 (joint account + 0.432*** 0.470*** 0.322*** 0.356*** 0.813*** 0.686*** 1.233*** 1.163***
                    migrant-only account) (0.164) (0.174) (0.122) (0.134) (0.243) (0.222) (0.278) (0.271)
Treatment 2 (joint account) 0.208 0.316** -0.055 -0.042 0.515** 0.471** 0.538** 0.612**
(0.143) (0.145) (0.055) (0.068) (0.205) (0.203) (0.237) (0.237)
Treatment 1 (PRR account only) 0.027 0.046 -0.020 -0.021 0.367* 0.321 0.364 0.319
(0.107) (0.104) (0.065) (0.079) (0.202) (0.204) (0.223) (0.228)
Constant 0.225*** 0.078 0.055 0.273 0.470*** 0.197 0.750*** 0.369
(0.087) (0.523) (0.055) (0.199) (0.112) (1.094) (0.143) (0.980)
M a r k e t e r  f i x e d  e f f e c t s YYYY
Observations 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-squared 0.019 0.130 0.044 0.123 0.020 0.126 0.039 0.142
P-value of F-test: equality of …
   Treatment 3 & 2 coeffs. 0.212 0.400 0.001 0.000 0.278 0.413 0.023 0.064
   Treatment 3 & 1 coeffs. 0.008 0.010 0.003 0.002 0.107 0.161 0.004 0.004
   Treatment 2 & 1 coeffs. 0.166 0.078 0.316 0.672 0.543 0.529 0.503 0.274
Mean of dep. var. in comparison group 0.225 0.055 0.470 0.750
Panel B (in dollars)
Treatment 3 (joint account + 135.173 188.150 31.361 33.423 389.601*** 312.574*** 556.134*** 534.147***
                    migrant-only account) (117.167) (148.999) (24.064) (25.973) (131.556) (115.378) (175.701) (190.761)
Treatment 2 (joint account) 89.403 140.727* -12.886 -13.149 286.795* 174.253* 363.312** 301.832**
(69.562) (82.795) (12.830) (14.781) (147.464) (103.903) (165.567) (137.280)
Treatment 1 (PRR account only) -15.839 -8.065 -10.501 -14.217 109.494* 49.877 83.154 27.595
(12.540) (34.131) (13.042) (15.476) (58.990) (101.570) (61.365) (107.148)
Constant 19.067 431.676* 12.886 26.748 33.239* -186.121 65.192*** 272.303
(12.485) (246.722) (12.830) (32.563) (17.255) (365.487) (24.435) (466.947)
C o n t r o l  V a r i a b l e s YYYY
Observations 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508
R-squared 0.006 0.067 0.017 0.100 0.014 0.125 0.020 0.107
P-value of F-test: equality of …
   Treatment 3 & 2 coeffs. 0.734 0.739 0.031 0.030 0.599 0.366 0.418 0.277
   Treatment 3 & 1 coeffs. 0.194 0.147 0.042 0.046 0.052 0.060 0.011 0.010
   Treatment 2 & 1 coeffs. 0.125 0.088 0.316 0.867 0.259 0.406 0.106 0.123
Mean of dep. var. in comparison group 19.067 12.886 33.239 65.192
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Dependent variables are averaged over end-of-month balances in US dollars. See Table 2 for other notes.
Cuenta Unidos accounts (in 
name of someone in El 
Salvador)
Ahorro Directo accounts 
(in name of migrant only)
Other accounts (in name of 
migrant or primary 
remittance recipient)
In total across all accounts
(a) (b) (c) (d) = (a) + (b) + (c)Appendix Table 5: Impact of treatments on joint account savings reported by migrant in non-partner banks 
                                   in follow-up survey
(Ordinary least-squares estimates)
Dependent variable: Savings not at partner bank …
... in joint accounts, 
migrant and primary 
remittance recipient
... in joint accounts, 
migrant and others
(1) (2)
Panal A (quartic root)
Treatment 3 (joint account + 0.059 0.120*
                    migrant-only account) (0.047) (0.072)
Treatment 2 (joint account) 0.027 0.215**
(0.023) (0.106)
Treatment 1 (PRR account only) 0.113 0.153
(0.104) (0.111)
Control variables Y Y
Observations 508 508
R-squared 0.044 0.070
P-value of F-test: equality of …
   Treatment 3 & 2 coeffs. 0.317 0.413
   Treatment 3 & 1 coeffs. 0.578 0.787
   Treatment 2 & 1 coeffs. 0.343 0.659
Panal B (in dollars)
Treatment 3 (joint account + 24.143 40.102
                    migrant-only account) (25.273) (29.590)
Treatment 2 (joint account) 18.495 91.163*
(23.690) (50.610)
Treatment 1 (PRR account only) 131.785 138.861
(126.342) (115.383)
Control variables Y Y
Observations 508 508
R-squared 0.047 0.073
P-value of F-test: equality of …
   Treatment 3 & 2 coeffs. 0.701 0.329
   Treatment 3 & 1 coeffs. 0.321 0.382
   Treatment 2 & 1 coeffs. 0.304 0.696
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes:  Dependent variable is stock of savings in US dollars. See Table 4 for other notes.